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Gender Essentialism and American Law: Why and How to Sever
the Connection
MELINA CONSTANTINE BELL*
American law presumes that all persons are born either female or male, and rests a
surprising number of legal entitlements on this presumption. Persons’ legal rights to
express their identity at work, to use public accommodations, and to retain legal
parenthood status with respect to their children may all depend on whether they are
female or male. Yet we, as individuals, generally have no choice regarding whether we are
legally designated female or male, just as people had no choice as to whether they were
designated “colored” or “white” under past racial discrimination schemes. The American
legal system plays a significant role in the construction, maintenance, and coercive
enforcement of the binary gender system that requires people to conform their identities
in distorting ways to be included politically. By sustaining the gender system, legal
institutions unnecessarily undermine human well-being, and unjustly and
disrespectfully constrain individual liberty. The United States and state governments
should re-examine laws that use sex or gender as a category by adapting the Law
Commission of Canada’s methodology in Beyond Conjugality. In this fashion,
American law can begin to move gradually away from the creation, maintenance, and
enforcement of the gender system.
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INTRODUCTION
In Kosilek v. Spencer,1 federal district court Judge Mark L. Wolf ordered the
Massachusetts Department of Corrections to provide Sex Reassignment Surgery
(SRS) for Michelle Kosilek, a prisoner designated male at birth who identifies as a
woman. Kosilek alleged that the defendant, the Commissioner of the
Massachusetts Department of Corrections (DOC), violated her2 Eighth
Amendment rights by denying her adequate medical care for Gender Identity
Disorder (GID).
Kosilek’s condition was so severe that she had attempted to castrate herself
and had twice attempted suicide while awaiting trial.3 Kosilek had filed an
earlier suit from prison, decided in 2002,4 requesting an injunction ordering the
DOC to provide medical care for her condition that met the usual standard of
care for patients with her diagnosis.5 One component of standard treatment is the
administration of female hormones to male-to-female transsexual patients.6
Kosilek was not using prescription hormones when she began her prison
sentence, although she had used black market hormones in the past.7 In response
to Kosilek’s suit, the Commissioner, Michael T. Maloney, implemented a blanket
policy providing that inmates could be prescribed female hormones only if they
had been receiving medically prescribed hormones prior to their incarceration.8
That policy made Kosilek ineligible for female hormone treatments.9 In 2000, to
comply with a court order, the DOC’s mental health team had engaged the
expertise of a physician, Dr. Forstein, who specialized in GID, to diagnose
Kosilek and to determine what medical treatment she would receive if not
incarcerated.10 The DOC’s policy was to deliver to inmates health care
“comparable in quality to that available in the community.”11 Dr. Forstein
recommended psychotherapy and psychiatric monitoring, female hormones, and
consultation with a surgeon who performs SRS. The court determined that
Kosilek’s care—which consisted largely of talk therapy and anti-depressants—
was not minimally adequate given the severity of Kosilek’s condition.12
In 2002, the court found that Kosilek had a serious medical need that was
not being met.13 However, to make out an Eighth Amendment claim, Kosilek
would have had to prove that the DOC Commissioner (Maloney) was
deliberately indifferent to her medical need, and that the indifference was likely
1. 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 204 (D. Mass. 2012), aff’d 740 F.3d 733, 773 (1st Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc,
774 F.3d 63, 84–85 (1st Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Kosilek v. O’Brien, 135 S. Ct. 2059 (2015).
2. Because Kosilek self-identifies as a woman, female pronouns will be used to refer to her.
Courts hearing this and related cases have not consistently used this convention.
3. Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 164 (D. Mass. 2002).
4. Id. at 158.
5. For the relevant standards, see infra note 36.
6. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 166–67.
7. Id. at 163.
8. Id. at 159–60.
9. Id. at 161, 189.
10. Id. at 168.
11. Id. at 167.
12. Id. at 189; see also Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 230–36 (D. Mass. 2012).
13. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 161.
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to continue. Kosilek was unsuccessful in establishing that claim.14 The court
warned Commissioner Maloney that if Kosilek’s serious medical need continued
unmet, now that he was on notice of the unmet need and his obligations under
the Eighth Amendment, such continued refusal to meet Kosilek’s medical need
would constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.15
Ten years later, Kosilek sued the then DOC Commissioner, Luis S. Spencer,
seeking an order that DOC provide her with SRS. Kosilek’s physicians believed
SRS to be the only means of effectively treating Kosilek’s condition given the
standard of medical care for GID and the failure of other treatments to provide
adequate relief.16 The findings of fact recited in both the earlier and later case
include the following.17 At the time of the first case against Maloney, Kosilek was
53 years old, serving a life sentence for murdering her wife. Kosilek had a
troubled youth, orphaned at age 3 and already believing she was female, though
she was punished for dressing or behaving femininely. Returned to her family at
age 10, she suffered sexual and physical abuse at their hands. She ran away from
home as a teenager, worked as a prostitute, and began to use illegal drugs. She
began taking hormones when a doctor prescribed them as payment for sex. She
met her wife, Cheryl McCaul, who was a volunteer counselor, while undergoing
drug rehabilitation. McCaul believed that their marriage would “cure” Kosilek of
her transsexual identity. Kosilek was later convicted of murdering McCaul
during a confrontation that arose from Kosilek wearing McCaul’s clothes. Since
her incarceration in a medium-security men’s prison, Kosilek has lived as a
woman. She legally changed her name to Michelle Lynne, has long hair and
fingernails, a feminine voice, and uses makeup. She has not been sexually
assaulted or sexually involved with anyone in the Massachusetts prison (though
she was serially raped during an earlier period of incarceration in Chicago). The
court found that Kosilek remained at substantial risk of serious harm (in the form
of self-mutilation or attempts at suicide) because she was not receiving adequate
care.
In order to establish that her Eighth Amendment rights were violated,
Kosilek had to prove that (1) she had a serious medical need, (2) SRS was the
only adequate treatment for it, and (3) the DOC was deliberately indifferent to
her serious medical need in denying her the only adequate treatment for it. In
order to rebut the DOC’s claim that there was a legitimate penological reason for
denying her treatment, she had to prove that (4) the DOC’s stated concerns about
prison security were not legitimate. In order to be entitled to an injunction
requiring the DOC to provide her with SRS, Kosilek had to prove further that (5)
the DOC’s deliberate indifference would continue into the future.
The DOC alleged that providing Kosilek with SRS “would create
insurmountable security problems.”18 However, the court found this claim to be
a pretext, with the Commissioner’s true reason for refusing to provide Kosilek

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 195.
Id. at 162.
Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 196–97.
Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 163–65; Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 212–19.
Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 197–98.
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with SRS being an aversion to “controversy, criticism, ridicule and scorn.”19 Since
the medical decision regarding Kosilek’s care was not made for a medical reason
or a legitimate penological purpose, the court found that the DOC violated
Kosilek’s Eighth Amendment rights, and that Kosilek had established that it
would continue to do so if the court did not issue an injunction for the DOC to
perform the procedures prescribed by Kosilek’s physicians, including SRS.20 The
court noted with apparent irritation the recalcitrance and evasion tactics
exhibited by Commissioner Maloney and his successors, Kathleen Dennehy and
Harold Clarke.21 The court also remarked that it was not within its authority to
decide where to house Kosilek after she underwent SRS; that issue would be for
the DOC to decide in good faith.22
The court found that Kosilek had met her burden of proof and ordered the
injunction.23 It rejected the notion that Kosilek should be denied proper medical
treatment, even SRS, because it would be unpopular or expensive. Other
treatments, it reasoned, such as treatments for cancer or kidney failure, are not
withheld from inmates because of their expense.24 Moreover, although a person
outside prison may not be able to afford the procedure, the DOC has a special
duty with respect to its inmates because they are in its custody, and so rendered
incapable of meeting their own needs.25 The court reasoned that to leave a
prisoner suffering from a treatable medical condition, with deliberate
indifference, when that prisoner is at substantial risk of serious harm, is cruel
and unusual according to contemporary standards.26 It concluded, citing other
federal cases, that medical care for an inmate must be “based upon an evaluation
of a prisoner’s unique circumstances rather than pursuant to a general policy
applicable to all prisoners,” such as the blanket policy that Maloney had
instituted.27 To conform to Eighth Amendment requirements, medical decisions
must be made only for medical reasons, unless there is “a legitimate penological

19. Id. at 198. The court quoted a local television news broadcast as evidence of the public
pressure to deny Kosilek SRS: “Later this week, the state will tell the federal court that sex surgery for
Michelle Kosilek would result in a security nightmare. When that happens, expect Kosilek to pursue
her lawsuit. Then a federal judge will eventually decide whether you will pay the bill for Kosilek’s
operation and beyond that, sex surgeries for other convicts serving time for horrendous crimes.” Id. at
223.
20. Id. at 198.
21. Luis S. Spencer was sued in his official capacity, as Commissioner of the DOC. The court
cited a pattern of “unconstitutional conduct” that the DOC had engaged in over an extended period
of time, and found that the delay tactics were likely to continue unless the court issued an injunction
requiring the DOC to provide Kosilek with SRS and other medically prescribed treatments. Id. at 247–
50.
22. Id. at 243.
23. The injunction was stayed pending appeal, conditional on the Commissioner (1) making all
necessary arrangements for Kosilek’s SRS, so it could proceed immediately in the event she won the
appeal; and (2) filing regular reports with the court documenting progress in making the
arrangements. Kosilek v. Spencer, No. 00-12455-MLW, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165852, at *2 (D. Mass.
Nov. 20, 2012).
24. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 156, 192; Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 199.
25. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 198.
26. Id. at 205–07.
27. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 183 (citing Allard v. Gomez, 9 F. App’x 793 (9th Cir. 2001)).
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purpose” in selecting an alternative form of care.28 The court found there was
none, since the concerns stated by the DOC were pretextual.29
The DOC appealed the district court’s injunction, and a three-judge panel of
the First Circuit affirmed by a 2-1 vote.30 The DOC requested, and was granted,
an en banc hearing.31 The First Circuit, en banc, declared that it would defer to the
district court’s conclusions of fact and credibility, and review the Eighth
Amendment issue of law de novo.32 The pivotal question on appeal was whether
the care that the DOC had offered Kosilek was constitutionally adequate. When
the injunction was issued,33 the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM) published by the American Psychiatric Association
recommended a diagnosis of GID when all the following criteria were met:
1. Strong and persistent cross-gender identification, defined as the desire to
be, or the insistence that one is, the other sex.
2. Persistent discomfort about one’s assigned sex or a sense of
inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex.
3. Absence of a concurrent physical intersex condition.
4. Evidence of clinically significant distress or impairment in social,
occupational, or other important areas of functioning.34
The district court had accepted the Harry Benjamin International Gender
Dysphoria Association’s Standards of Care for Gender Identity Disorders as
representing the standard of care for treatment that would be accepted by
prudent medical professionals. According to this protocol, treatment of GID
(after proper diagnosis and counseling) proceeds according to an escalating 3step process, as needed. First, the patient is administered hormone therapy to
make them35 more physically like a person of their desired sex. Second, if the first
stage of treatment does not resolve the person’s clinically significant distress or
impairment in functioning, the person is to live for two years in the social role of
a person of the desired sex (“cross-live”). If the second stage of treatment does
not resolve the person’s clinically significant distress or impairment in
functioning, they are to undergo sex reassignment surgery (SRS).36 A relatively
28. Id. at 183.
29. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 238–49.
30. Kosilek v. Spencer, 740 F.3d 733 (1st Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 774 F.3d 63, 84–85 (1st Cir.
2014), cert. denied sub nom. Kosilek v. O’Brien, 135 S. Ct. 2059 (2015).
31. Kosilek v. Spencer, No. 12-2194, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 2660, at *3 (1st Cir. Feb. 12, 2014).
32. Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 84–85 (1st Cir. 2014) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Kosilek v.
O’Brien, 135 S. Ct. 2059 (2015).
33. The DSM has since been revised. See infra p. 179.
34. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 581 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].
35. I have adopted the convention, following John Rawls, of using plural pronouns as a gender
neutral alternative to singular gendered pronouns. Because some still regard this as ungrammatical, it
is my hope that a better solution to the pronoun problem will be forthcoming.
36. See generally HARRY BENJAMIN INTERNATIONAL GENDER DYSPHORIA ASSOCIATION,
STANDARDS OF CARE FOR GENDER IDENTITY DISORDERS (6th ed. 2001) [hereinafter Benjamin
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few number of people with GID get SRS, possibly because of the expense, or
because they find relief through the first two stages of treatment, or for other
reasons.
Experts in both Kosilek v. Spencer (2012) and Kosilek v. Maloney (2002)
disagreed about what level of treatment would meet prudent professional
standards of care, which the district and appeals courts both acknowledged was
the standard required by the Eighth Amendment. Whether the Benjamin
Standards constituted the relevant professional standard, or merely served as
guidelines that a prudent professional might accept or reject, was in dispute.
Also in dispute was whether a prisoner could meet the cross-living requirement
while in an all-male prison. To the dissenters’ dismay, the majority treated these
questions as mixed questions of law and fact, instead of as questions of fact.37
The majority concluded that the Benjamin Standards were flexible guidelines
from which a prudent professional might depart, particularly when fulfillment of
the cross-living requirement was in question.38 For that reason, the First Circuit
found that the DOC’s decision to provide treatment other than SRS, including
psychotherapy, anti-depressants, hormones, electrolysis, and female clothing and
cosmetic items, did not cause Kosilek harm significant enough to violate the
Eighth Amendment.39 It thus rejected both the district court’s conclusion that SRS
was the only medically adequate treatment available, and its conclusion that the
DOC showed deliberate indifference to Kosilek’s medical need when it refused
to provide her SRS.40 Furthermore, the court found that the DOC’s expressed
concerns about security were legitimate: in a female prison, Kosilek might
traumatize fellow inmates, many of whom had suffered domestic abuse41; in the
men’s prison where she resided, one quarter of the population were convicted
rapists,42 and she would be vulnerable to rape; and finally, if she received SRS,
that might provide an incentive for people to commit crimes or feign suicide or
self-mutilation attempts in order to obtain state-funded SRS.43 Therefore, the First
Circuit reversed the district court’s order of injunction and remanded the case for
dismissal.44
Transgender rights advocates will find this outcome disappointing because
transgender identity seems to preclude recognition of civil rights. Bigotry against
Kosilek as a transgender person seems to have driven the decisions about her
care, and Kosilek should have received the SRS that her physicians prescribed for
her, which she would be able to obtain if she had not been not incarcerated and

Standards]. These were the standards of care previously endorsed by the World Professional
Association for Transgender Health. They were in effect at the time the Kosilek cases were decided.
They are available at http://www.cpath.ca/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/WPATHsocv6.pdf (last
visited Aug. 28, 2015).
37. Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 97–99 (1st Cir. 2014) (en banc) (Thompson, J., dissenting); id.
at 114–15 (Kayatta, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 86–90 (majority opinion).
39. Id. at 89–90.
40. Id. at 91–92.
41. Id. at 80.
42. Id. at 24.
43. Id. at 92–96.
44. Id. at 96.
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had adequate financial means (or if affordable quality medical care were
universally available).45
At the same time, we should be reluctant to consider any legal outcome, the
way the issues are framed, as a victory for transgender rights. As civil rights
advocates have frequently pointed out, that socially disadvantaged minorities
can sometimes individually overcome their disadvantages does not make those
socially imposed disadvantages acceptable from the standpoint of justice.
Consider preferential treatment affirmative action in hiring or education as a
rough comparison. Such affirmative action is a strategy for countering injustice,
and is meant to be a temporary solution until social justice renders it unnecessary
by extending equal opportunity to all. Transgender surgery, I suggest, is a
temporary measure that should be made available to those who desire it, after
being fully informed about its likely entailments and outcomes, until the injustice
of gender can be eliminated. Nevertheless, we should still, as a society, aspire to,
and take steps to, eliminate that injustice in the long term.
Even if Kosilek had received the surgery to which she is arguably entitled,
the justification provided for why she was entitled to it further entrenches the
gender system that causes so much unnecessary suffering for Kosilek and many
others. The proffered justification is a natural outgrowth of the invidious sex
segregation system created and enforced by the American legal system and the
American medical establishment. In what follows, I intend to demonstrate how
the courts’ reasoning in the Kosilek cases further entrenches retrogressive cultural
norms. I do not mean to claim that these cases are the only ones that fuel these
norms, or that they are the most egregious cases in this respect. I only mean to
use them as a paradigm example of how the legal system—probably
inadvertently—entrenches damaging gender norms. In particular, I argue against
the notion that in a just society SRS could be medically necessary to correct a
pathology in which a person is gravely and understandably distressed by a
mismatch between the sex of their body and the gender of their psyche. That is, I
reject the idea that personal integration and mental health can be achieved, on a
society-wide basis, by causing people’s somatic sex to match their “brain sex.”
Instead, I argue, the pathology presented by transsexualism (where there is
pathology) is located not in any individual(s), but in the cultural notion of sex
itself. It is not the aim of this article to criticize individual persons who decide to
undergo SRS for mental health or any other reasons. Given our cultural notions
of biological sex and its meanings, SRS currently may be the best option for some
people, and this is a matter for individuals to decide for themselves. My critique
is of the cultural notions of sex, not the persons on whom these notions force
such difficult choices.
In part I, I characterize the concepts that I rely on throughout this article,
including what I mean when I refer to “gender,” “sex,” “transgender,” and
“intersex,” and what the relevant distinctions are between related concepts. I
explain how the medical community regards, diagnoses, and treats intersex and
45. Kosilek is old enough to qualify for Medicare if she were not incarcerated. Medicare no
longer categorically excludes SRS from the list of reimbursable medical procedures because it is
regarded as medically necessary for some patients, not as a cosmetic procedure. E.g., Lisa Leff,
Medicare Ban on Sex Reassignment Surgery Lifted, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 30, 2014, 10:29 PM),
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/medicare-coverage-ban-sex-change-surgery-lifted.
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transgender conditions, and I describe what sex reassignment surgery entails
and is meant to accomplish. I raise questions about the manner in which
treatment objectives related to intersex and transgender conditions are
conceptualized and pursued. Finally, I discuss why scientific evidence should
dispel the notion, if we are being epistemically responsible and not ideological,
that there is such a thing as “brain sex.”46 In part II, I describe how binary
gender—and even binary sex to some extent—are socially constructed by
institutions such as law and medicine. I explain how transgender and intersex
conditions emerge from this binary model of sex and gender and are related to it.
Then I address the way gendered social practices contribute to mental illness,
and unnecessarily, unjustly, and disrespectfully constrain individual liberty. In
part III, I consider how the legal system can gradually relinquish its role in
creating, maintaining, and enforcing a gender system. I recommend the
methodology that the Law Commission of Canada employed for assessing its
role in recognizing close personal adult relationships for the purposes of various
laws. I then apply the Commission’s methodology to three legal domains that
currently depend on sex-based categories—identification documents, sports, and
prison housing—to demonstrate how the methodology can aid policymakers to
identify and reform laws and policies that unnecessarily cause harm by using
and reinforcing the gender system.
I. THE GENDER SYSTEM
Sandra Lipsitz Bem details how three “lenses of gender” serve as cultural
filters through which people interpret the world. These lenses include gender
polarization, biological essentialism, and androcentrism.47 Together, they
“systematically reproduce male power” because they, first, channel men and
women into unequal life situations, and second, become internalized and bound
up with the personal identities of individuals.48 The lenses of gender generally
operate below the level of conscious awareness, and this is what makes them so
difficult to see: we look through them, not at them, much as a fish fails to see
water in its environment. It permeates everything, and our experience contains
no alternative model.49

46. Those who argue for the existence of “brain sex” claim that female brains are innately
organized to produce feminine social behavior and male brains are innately organized to produce
masculine social behavior. See generally, e.g., ANNE MOIR & DAVID JESSEL, BRAIN SEX: THE REAL
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN (1992).
47. SANDRA LIPSITZ BEM, THE LENSES OF GENDER: TRANSFORMING THE DEBATE ON SEXUAL
INEQUALITY 2 (1993). Bem defines androcentrism as male-centeredness: the unconscious tendency to
regard males and male experience as the neutral standard or norm, where females and female
experience are regarded by persons, and treated by social institutions, as sex-specific deviations from
the norm. Id. at 41. For example, the paradigmatic worker in the labor market is a person who cannot
become pregnant (male), so pregnancy and lactation present special considerations in the workplace;
they are not ordinary life events that are presumed will be experienced by many workers at some
time.
48. Id. at 3.
49. Id. at 140.
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A. Gender
Although “gender” is frequently used as a euphemism for “sex” on forms
we complete, what I mean by “gender” is conceptually distinct from sex. Gender
is produced by the lens that Bem refers to as gender polarization: “the ubiquitous
organization of social life around the distinction between female and male.”
Gender polarization defines mutually exclusive female and male roles (i.e.,
masculinity and femininity), and characterizes departures from these roles as
pathological deviations and punishes them.50 Examples of feminine traits
according to Bem’s Sex Role Inventory include being yielding, cheerful, shy,
affectionate, flatterable, loyal, sympathetic, sensitive to the needs of others,
understanding, compassionate, soft-spoken, warm, tender, gullible, childlike,
child-loving, and gentle. Masculine traits include being self-reliant, independent,
athletic, assertive, forceful, analytical, dominant, aggressive, individualistic,
competitive, ambitious, willing to take risks, able to defend one’s beliefs and to
make decisions easily, and having leadership abilities and a strong personality. It
is generally expected that female humans (often understood by gender scholars
as a biological category) should be feminine (a social category), and that male
humans should be masculine. Female humans are expected to and usually do
conform to, and are punished for failing to conform to, feminine behavioral
scripts. The same is true for male humans and masculine gender scripts. Thus,
we are thoroughly socialized, in overt and subtle ways, to believe and behave as
though the sex of the body is naturally connected to the gender of the psyche.
Traits and dispositions that are socially acceptable in both women and men are
thus neither feminine nor masculine. What is assigned to each pole, and what is
acceptable for either sex, varies somewhat from culture to culture, and across
different periods in history, but the assignments are artificially constructed by
society rather than arising spontaneously from biological differences between
females and males. Gender is necessarily normative: it involves policing the
boundaries of properly gendered behavior, such that a person who departs from
norms of gender is subject to some degree of social ostracism.
Bem argues (and empirical data support) that the female-male dichotomy is
socially constructed, because there is a “biological continuum of genes,
chromosomes, hormones,” and so forth, and none of these, nor their correlates, is
as “bimodally distributed” as we might think. Bem also cites the temporal and
geographical variation in gender construction: some cultures, rather than
dichotomizing gender, recognize three or more genders.51
B. Biological Essentialism
Biological differentiation of the sexes is the focus of the second lens of
gender, biological essentialism, which causes us to view differences between men
and women as natural, so that sex difference—and the inequality that
accompanies it—-are regarded as inevitable.52 As Bem demonstrates, the
scientific evidence does not support this. In the past, pregnancy and lactation

50.
51.
52.

Id. at 80–81.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 2.
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may have required certain roles for women (those that did not demand intense
physical exertion, or that could be done with infants carried or small children in
tow), and it may have made sense for men to take on different, complementary
roles. But sex-based role divisions are unnecessary in societies with modern
technology. Many jobs are not physically demanding, most women have few
enough children that time off for certain stages of pregnancy and recovery can be
arranged, breast milk can be expressed and stored and children can be bottle-fed,
paid child care is or could be a viable option, and so forth. With the exception of
pregnancy and childbirth, men can play the same role in child rearing as women,
given our current technology. Our technology alters what is possible for us,
given our biology: because of airplanes we can fly, and because of medicine we
can survive many illnesses that would have killed our ancestors.53 For this
reason, the domain of gender expands and contracts. For example, it used to be
considered masculine to participate in sports. However, since the passage of Title
IX and the expansion of women’s sports programs in educational institutions,
athleticism has become compatible with femininity.
Bem’s research indicates that the only reason we have for believing that the
gender of the psyche is naturally connected to the sex of the body is a strong
prejudice contradicted by much evidence. What humans feel and enjoy doing are
not naturally distributed along lines of sex, even though we artificially conform
feelings and behavior to gender scripts. Diversity of disposition among women,
and diversity of disposition among men, are both natural.54 Imagine gender as a
spectrum, with femininity at one pole and masculinity at the other. It could be
socially acceptable for both human females and males to display any of the full
range of human traits and behaviors; neither would be punished for straying too
far from their socially assigned domain. Still, for nearly all of us, there is a strong
tendency to perceive sex difference as dichotomous and natural.
Recall that gender is normative, and it involves policing the boundaries of
human behavior and identity and punishing people with ostracism, or worse, for
departing from gender roles. Suppose, just for the sake of argument, that women
naturally have a tendency toward a different behavioral repertoire than men.
How would any such tendency recommend what sorts of social norms or human
behavior is acceptable, or what sorts of boundaries should be enforced? After all,
it is arguably natural to relieve oneself whenever and wherever the need arises,
to engage in sexual relations with anyone one finds sexually appealing, and to
strike any person who has angered one; but people are deliberately socialized to
resist natural impulses that are socially undesirable. So it does not follow that all
feelings or behaviors that are natural are desirable and should be reinforced or
expressed in behavior. As beings with a culture, we shape the raw material
nature provides us, ideally in the way that gives us the most flourishing lives.
Biology is not destiny. So we should preserve our gender scripts if they give us
the most flourishing lives, and gradually dismantle them if they interfere with
human flourishing.

53. See BEM, supra note 47, at 21–23 (“[T]he impact of any biological feature depends in every
instance on how that biological feature interacts with the environment in which it is situated.”).
54. Id. at 167–68. See also MICHAEL S. KIMMEL, THE GENDERED SOCIETY 9–11 (2008).
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C. Sex
Some scholars and researchers accept biological sex difference as the natural
foundation for gender. That is, they regard sex as natural and biological; all
species that sexually reproduce are supposed biologically female or male (except
hermaphroditic species such as certain snails, mollusks, and fish that change
their sex as they age). On this view, being female occurs naturally; it is an
immutable characteristic. Whereas, femininity is defined and becomes part of
one’s identity through social practices, so that one could, in principle, refuse to
conform to its standards. While this distinction can be useful for the purposes of
introductory courses in women’s studies or gender theory, the real picture is far
more complicated than this.
If one wanted to support the claim that a particular person is biologically
female (or male), there are a few different features that one could take as
evidence. First, there is the common method of inspecting genitals, which
generally occurs immediately after one is born. A newborn is usually
pronounced a boy or girl based on the appearance of their genitals. Second, a
chromosomal test could be performed, as had been done with female Olympic
athletes in the late 1900s, to determine whether the individual is XX or XY. Third,
one could check gonads: are there ovaries or testes? And finally, one could test
the proportions of so-called sex hormones such as androgens, estrogens, and
progestogens, to see whether the hormone profile is a typical female or male
profile. The prevailing assumption in society, among ordinary people and
medical experts, is that in “normal” people, all of these correspond. That is, a
person who is XX has a vagina and ovaries, and has a higher ratio of estrogens
and progestogens to androgens; she is female. A person who is XY has a penis
and testes, and has a higher proportion of androgens to estrogens and
progestogens; he is male.
If that were true, biological sex might justly be regarded as dichotomous.
However, in at least 1.7% of the population,55 these features do not correspond at
birth.56 The prevalence of non-correspondence probably is actually higher,
however, since some people never find out that these features do not correspond
in them. For example, in 1985, Spanish hurdler Maria Patino discovered she had
XY chromosomes when she (along with every female athlete who qualified for
the World Games) was tested by the International Association of Athletics
Federations (IAAF) and quietly forced out of competition. If Patino were not an
elite athlete, she may never have discovered that she is XY. In 2009, when
Olympic track athlete Caster Semenya won a gold medal for South Africa in the
800 meter race, a controversy erupted over how the International Olympic
Committee (IOC) should determine who qualifies to compete as a woman.
Semenya was adjudicated a woman by the IOC and allowed to keep her medal,
but the IOC consequently developed new guidelines for determining who

55. Melanie Blackless et al., How Sexually Dimorphic Are We? Review and Synthesis, 12 AM. J. HUM.
BIOLOGY 151, 161 (2000).
56. See REBECCA M. JORDAN-YOUNG, BRAIN STORM: THE FLAWS IN THE SCIENCE OF SEX
DIFFERENCES 17–18 (2010) (describing how research on intersex infants breaks down the distinction
between sex and gender).
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qualifies as a woman.57 According to the new guidelines, women who are
chromosomally XX but naturally have atypically high testosterone levels (such as
Semenya) are barred from competing as women in the Olympics, because their
hormone profiles are regarded as giving them an unfair advantage.58 These
examples demonstrate the way sex itself is socially defined; there is no biological
definition of “female.” We must make policy decisions about who counts as
female, male, or neither.
D. Intersex
When a person is born with an intersex condition, it is not clear whether the
person should be regarded as female or male. Sometimes that is because the
person’s genitals are ambiguous (such as when the penis is very small or the
clitoris is very large). Other times, the person’s genitals seem to indicate that they
are one sex, while their chromosomes and/or hormones indicate that they are the
other sex. In what follows, I will briefly describe the most common, widely
studied intersex conditions.
Genital ambiguity is most often caused by congenital adrenal hypoplasia
(CAH). Genetic females (XX) with CAH are exposed in utero to high levels of
androgens, which are overproduced by their adrenal glands. That results in
masculine-looking genitals (usually a large clitoris, and sometimes a penis).
Labia may be fused so they appear scrotum-like (without testes inside).
Approximately 25% of CAH females are pronounced male at birth.59 CAH males,
however, do not seem to differ significantly from males who were not exposed to
high androgen levels in utero.
Androgen insensitivity syndrome (AIS) can cause genetic males (XY) to
have external genitals that appear female, while their internal organs are male
typical. They have testes that produce androgens, but they do not have receptors
sensitive to the androgens and are not able to make use of them. AIS males are in
a sense the inverse of CAH females: they are genetically male but unable to use,
and so deprived of, androgen, whereas CAH females are exposed to atypically
high levels of androgens.60 In genetic males with 5-alpha reductase deficiency (5ARD), androgens are in the normal range for males, but the enzyme (5-alpha
reductase) needed to develop male genitals is not present. Frequently, 5-ARD
boys’ genitals “masculinize” at puberty.61
The final intersex category I wish to note consists of genetic males who are

57. Eric Vilain, Gender Testing for Athletes Remains a Tough Call, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/18/sports/olympics/the-line-between-male-and-femaleathletes-how-to-decide.html.
58. Critics note that Olympic athletes have many genetic advantages over other competitors:
height, long legs, keen eyesight, etc. Men have varying levels of testosterone, and those with the
highest levels are not deemed to have an unfair advantage. Moreover, there seems to be no general
connection between high testosterone levels and athletic performance in elite female athletes. E.g.,
Rebecca Jordan-Young & Katrina Karkazis, You Say You’re a Woman? That Should Be Enough, N.Y.
TIMES (June 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/18/sports/olympics/olympic-sexverification-you-say-youre-a-woman-that-should-be-enough.html.
59. JORDAN-YOUNG, supra note 56, at 69–70.
60. Id. at 74.
61. Id. at 67.
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born with male-typical genitals, hormone exposures, and chromosomes, but who
lose their penis in an accident (such as during circumcision). When that occurs,
the genetic male has generally been raised as a girl.62
There are, additionally, chromosomal variations in humans beyond the XX
and XY genotypes. For example, it is possible for a person to be XYY, XXY, or
XXYY (all considered male); or XO (one X chromosome only) or XXX (both
considered female).63 During cell division, chromosomes can break, resulting in
loss, duplication, or inversion of the chromosome fragment. The fragment may
also travel from the sex chromosome pairing and become attached to a different
pair of chromosomes.
For decades it was the standard of care in medicine to perform corrective
surgery immediately after birth on infants with significant genital ambiguity.
Generally, parents were not told that the medical professionals attending their
child were making decisions about whether to perform “corrective” surgery to
make their child female or male. Instead, doctors told parents that their child was
a girl (or boy) whose genitals were not formed properly; the child would need
surgical operations to correct a deformity.64 Thus, these operations were
presented as medically necessary.
Generally, if the newborn had an XY genotype and a penis capable of (1)
penetrating a vagina, and (2) urinating while standing, he would be assigned to
the male sex; otherwise, the child would be assigned to the female sex. Surgery
was then performed so that the child’s anatomy would conform as well as
possible to the assignment. In some cases, that meant removing gonads that did
not conform to the assignment, resulting in sterility. However, an XX child
judged able to reproduce would be assigned to the female sex, regardless of the
appearance of external genitals. If the clitoris appeared too large (3/8 of an inch
or more) it might be reduced or removed, resulting in reduction or lack of sexual
sensation. Critics of these practices, for which there was almost clearly no
informed consent from parents, often point out that men are medically defined
by their ability to penetrate a vagina, and women by their ability to procreate.65
The perceived urgency to reshape intersex characteristics so they appear as
typical female or typical male characteristics may have arisen from any number
of social factors, including medical providers’ belief that binary sex is natural and
normal and that intersex conditions are a form of disease; the desire to spare
parents the anxiety of having a child who does not neatly fit into our social
narrative about binary sex; and the desire to spare the child anxiety caused by
difference or by lack of social acceptance. The social narrative about binary sex
seems concerned primarily with promoting heterosexuality as the only normal
and natural way to be connected to a life partner. It is conceptually impossible
for a person who is neither female nor male to participate in a heterosexual

62. Id. at 75–79.
63. Blackless et al., supra note 55, at 152.
64. E.g., Karen Gurney, Sex and The Surgeon’s Knife: The Family Court’s Dilemma: Informed Consent
and the Specter of Iatrogenic Harm to Children with Intersex Characteristics, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 625, 632
(2007); Chinyere Ezie, Deconstructing the Body: Transgender and Intersex Identities and Sex
Discrimination—The Need for Strict Scrutiny, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 141, 150–51 (2011).
65. E.g., Gurney, supra note 64, at 633; JORDAN-YOUNG, supra note 56, at 17, 258, 261.
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relationship with a person who is female, male, or neither.66
The medical procedures viewed as urgent to make a newborn into an
unambiguous female or male are by no means simple or painless. Often children
are required to undergo extensive monitoring and multiple surgeries for
decades. Even with modern techniques, sexual reconstruction is only moderately
successful in transforming the intersex person into a “normal,” functioning, welladjusted, and flourishing female or male. Consider, for example, the protocol for
treating and managing congenital adrenal hypoplasia (CAH) in girls and
women. Usually female CAH newborns do not have vaginas that ever will grow
large enough to be penetrated, and have “unaesthetic” vulvas and large
clitorises. That is taken to require the construction or significant augmentation of
the vagina and/or vulva and removal or reduction of the clitoris. Although in
more recent surgeries there is an attempt to preserve sensation, patients usually
report that sensation is absent or minimal due to extensive nerve damage.67
Generally, the first surgeries to accomplish these results occur in early
childhood. Then in adolescence or early adulthood, it is common for additional
surgeries to be performed to correct difficulties caused by the earlier surgeries,
including narrowing of the vaginal opening (usually due to scarring or growth),
fistulas, and incontinence.68 Most CAH women report finding vaginal
penetration painful and more than a third say they never engage in it. A large
majority of the CAH women who have engaged in penile-vaginal intercourse
report low rates of orgasm, lubrication, and satisfaction.69 They also report not
masturbating, or not enjoying masturbation, though they perform it as a medical
procedure to keep their vaginas open or to survey what the surgeons have
done.70 Additionally, CAH women report feeling violated and humiliated by the
numerous physician visits undergone in their lives. Three or four times a year, a
doctor would examine their genitals.71
Intersex activists recently have voiced their perspective that these surgeries
are cosmetic, medically unnecessary, and cause more pain and illness than they
prevent.72 There are also advocates for providing the child and child’s parents
enough information to make an informed decision, as well as for delaying these
traumatic and invasive surgeries until the child is old enough to decide for
themselves.73
E. Transgender
A person who is transgender does not identify with the gender connected to
their sex assignment. For example, a transgender person may be regarded as

66. E.g., GIANNA E. ISRAEL & DONALD E. TARVER II, TRANSGENDER CARE: RECOMMENDED
GUIDELINES, PRACTICAL INFORMATION, AND PERSONAL ACCOUNTS xii (1997); JORDAN-YOUNG, supra
note 56, at 129.
67. JORDAN-YOUNG, supra note 56, at 240–41.
68. Id. at 240.
69. Id. at 241.
70. Id. at 243.
71. Id. at 242–43.
72. JORDAN-YOUNG, supra note 56, at 245. See generally Gurney, supra note 64.
73. Gurney, supra note 64, at 661.
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“female” by physicians and “female” may appear on the person’s birth
certificate, but the person rejects that identity. He may dress as a man, take
hormones to appear more masculine, and/or go by a name that is considered a
male name. Or, alternatively, the person may reject the social gender binary
altogether, and choose not to emphasize femaleness or maleness. The person
may dress androgynously and/or go by a name that is used by both men and
women. “Transgender” is not a formal diagnosis of illness; rather, it is an identity
that individuals may adopt.
One formal diagnostic category that may apply to a transgender person is
“transsexualism.” A transsexual person is a person who has “the desire to live
and be accepted as a member of the opposite sex, usually accompanied by the
wish to make his or her body as congruent as possible with the preferred sex
through surgery and hormone treatment.”74 In order to be regarded as
transsexual by the medical community, a person must have had a transsexual
identity “persistently” for at least two years and their transsexualism must not be
“a symptom of another mental disorder or chromosomal abnormality.”75
According to the World Professional Association for Transgender Health, 1 in
11,900 to 45,000 people assigned male at birth, and 1 in 30,400 to 200,000 people
assigned female at birth, is transsexual.76
Transgender surgery for a person transitioning from male to female (an MtF
transsexual person) involves genital reconstruction including removal of the
testes and penis and creation of a vulva, clitoris, and vagina. It is also likely to
involve some or all of the following: breast augmentation, tracheal shave, voice
augmentation, facial reconstructive procedures, and laser hair removal and/or
electrolysis. A female to male transsexual person (FtM) typically needs a radical
hysterectomy, in which the uterus, ovaries, and fallopian tubes are removed, the
creation of a penis and the insertion of prosthetic testicles, and a double
mastectomy and chest reconstruction. He may also need facial reconstructive
procedures. In both cases, “revisions” may be necessary to repair problems that
develop from the initial surgeries. For example, FtM people (transmen) may need
adjustments to their urinary tracts; MtF people (transwomen) may need to have
fistulas or certain muscles removed. In a 2001 estimate, SRS for transwomen was
projected to cost $7,000-$50,000; for transmen it was projected to cost $100,000.
The surgeries and recovery are painful, can have many complications, and often
result in anatomical features that are disappointing to patients.77 For example,
Israel and Tarver’s transgender care guidelines, which are intended to give
transgender persons a guide for making informed decisions about their options,
say of FtM phalloplasty (construction of a penis) that its cosmetic results tend to
be “poor, to moderately appealing.” MtF vaginoplasty results vary from poor to
excellent.78
Transsexualism is often understood, by transsexual persons, medical

74. Benjamin Standards, supra note 36, at 4–5.
75. Id.
76. E. Coleman et al., Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender, and GenderNonconforming People, 13 INT’L J. TRANSGENDERISM 165, 169 (2011).
77. See ISRAEL & TARVER, supra note 66, chs. 4–5.
78. Id. at 85–95.
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professionals who work with them, and judges deciding matters relating to
aspects of transsexualism, as instances in which a person feels strongly that they
were born with or inhabit “the wrong body.” That is, he feels like a man trapped
inside a woman’s body, or she feels like a woman trapped inside a man’s body.
Thus, the person’s mind (or “brain”) sex does not match the sex suggested by the
rest of a person’s body, such as their genitals and secondary sex characteristics.
Recall that psychologists such as Bem have long criticized the idea that there are
female psyches that are supposed to match up with male bodies, and male
psyches that are supposed to match up with female bodies, where both are
neatly dichotomized.
It is worth noting that the most recent version of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual, the DSM V, has replaced the chapter on Gender Identity
Disorder with a chapter on Gender Dysphoria. That change is meant to recognize
that the clinical problem is not a person’s gender identity, but the dysphoria
experienced as a result of the incongruence between the person’s gender identity
and the gender identity expected of a person who was assigned that person’s sex
at birth. The chapter also recognizes that “[e]xperienced gender may include
alternative gender identities beyond binary stereotypes.”79 The six diagnostic
criteria involve incongruence between a person’s experienced gender and their
anatomical sex characteristics; a strong desire to change primary or secondary
sex characteristics, or to be, or be treated as, a different gender; and a firm belief
that one feels and reacts in a way typical of another gender. Two of the six
criteria must be present for at least six months in order for a diagnosis of gender
dysphoria to be appropriate.80
F. The Myth of Brain Sex
Despite much research attempting to verify that there is something such as
“brain sex” that is part of a natural process of sexual differentiation —and that
female brains as a class differ from male brains as a class—the evidence does not
support this theory. Nonetheless it remains popular, and even scientists often
have difficulty overcoming confirmation bias in favor of this socially inculcated
theory.81 The notion of brain sex seems to play a prominent role in the thinking
of Judge Wolf and many other generally well-informed and well-meaning
people. The incorrect supposition is that Kosilek and other transgender people
have a disease: the gender of their brain does not match the sex of their body. Yet
transgender individuals are not sick because they have a transgender identity;
rather, the society is sick because it requires people to conform to a gender
assignment. The pathology presented by transsexualism (where there is
pathology) is located not in any individual(s), but in the cultural notion of sex
itself. That is not to deny that the cultural notion of sex becomes internalized and
deeply ingrained in most people’s personal identities, in varying forms and to

79. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 453 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-V].
80. Id. at 452.
81. For a plausible explanation, see Letitia Meynell, Evolutionary Psychology, Ethology, and
Essentialism (Because What They Don’t Know Can Hurt Us), 27 HYPATIA 3, 21 (2012).
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varying degrees.82 Cultural notions of sex are transmitted to individuals as
children in many subtle ways, most of which are not conscious or open to
reflection, using a sort of “subliminal pedagogy.”83 That is why it is so important
to reform the cultural notion of sex that becomes incorporated into personal
identities.84 Society contributes to a great deal of mental illness, as I will explain,85
simply by constructing, enculturating people to have, and policing, notions
about biological sex, sex roles, and sex-typed identities. The change we need,
then, is not to cause people’s bodies to “match” their brains,86 but to stop socially
and legally enforcing a system in which people’s identities and behaviors are
imposed on them by others, based on morally irrelevant physical features.
Why have scientists endorsed the theory of innate brain sex, despite its lack
of evidentiary support? Prior to the 1960s, animal researchers studied the
organization of animal brains by certain prenatal hormones in utero, which seem
to “hardwire” them to perform certain survival-enhancing behaviors, including
sexual reproduction. These studies are known in the scientific literature as “brain
organization research” (BOR). In 1967, the theory was first applied to humans,
and BOR attempted to show that certain feminine traits and behaviors were
hardwired in females, and certain masculine traits and behaviors were
hardwired in males, if sexual development proceeded normally.87 (Note the
teleological orientation of that hypothesis: there is a proper direction in which
sexual development should occur.)
Since the 1960s, numerous studies made headlines announcing differences
found in human female and male brains, the discovery of a “gay” brain, and so
forth. Popular audiences tend to welcome these announcements, which seem to
justify familiar social practices and confirm the beliefs most of us already have.88
Recently, however, scientists have been re-examining the studies that purport to
find hardwired female and male differences in the brain, and have found serious
flaws in these studies, suggesting that there is no hardwired difference at all.89
If we observe female behaviors, traits, dispositions, and even physical
brains—and the male counterparts—we can generalize some differences between
the two groups. Note, however, that this does not suggest behaviors are innate or
hardwired. One unique feature of the human brain is that, compared to other
82. See BEM, supra note 47, ch. 5, for a detailed discussion of how gender identities are
constructed via an enculturation process.
83. Id. at 141.
84. Id. at 192–94.
85. See discussion infra Part II.B.
86. So long as society continues to construct and enforce gender, however, it remains obligated
to relieve the suffering caused by the unjust gender system. For that reason, SRS should be made
available to those who desire it after being fully informed about its likely entailments and outcomes,
at least until the injustice of gender can be eliminated.
87. JORDAN-YOUNG, supra note 56, at 29.
88. See Meynell, supra note 81, at 5 (noting that “the sex essentialism of folk biology does not
reflect the central insights of evolutionary biology” (citations omitted)). Meynell concludes that “only
willful ignorance, buoyed by a prior commitment to sex dimorphism, seems able to explain why this
research program persists.” Id. at 21.
89. See generally JORDAN-YOUNG, supra note 56. See also Catherine Vidal, The Sexed Brain: Between
Science and Ideology, 5 NEUROETHICS 295 (2012) (offering “evidence against archaic beliefs about the
biological determinism of sex differences”).
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animal brains, it is very plastic: it changes and adapts to stimuli in the
environment to a far greater extent than other animals, even close primate
relatives. That may be because the gestation period required to bring human
beings to a later stage of development would place too great a demand on the
mother’s metabolism for too long. Human babies are born unable to walk or care
for themselves, and their cognitive development as well as their physical
development proceeds for longer outside the uterus, because they do not have,
relatively speaking, as much development time within the uterus. Because the
human interacts more with the environment outside the uterus as it develops,
human brains are much more plastic. Less is hardwired as instinct, and more is
learned from the environment and social culture.90
Human early birth and the unique plasticity of the human brain mean that
more is determined by nurture, and less by nature, compared to other animals.91
Therefore, when we notice that on average the development of female brains is
concentrated in certain brain regions, and the development of male brains in
other regions, we understand that this could be attributed to innate differences or
to socialized differences. That is, behavioral differences we observe, on average,
between men and women could be due to innate brain differences; or because
men and women are socialized to behave differently, the different behavior
could develop different regions of the brain. The direction of causation is not
established by the observation of an average difference, even it if is significant.92
But the average difference is actually very small. For example, while on average
men have slightly better spatial ability and women have slightly better verbal
ability, there is so much overlap in both instances that an expert observer could
only guess whether a subject is female or male by looking at their verbal or
spatial test scores 60% of the time, compared with 50% by chance alone.93
Brain organization research (BOR) attempts to connect hormone exposures
in utero to various sorts of behavior observed in men but not in women, and vice
versa. The basic idea is that the androgens to which males are exposed in utero
cause the brain to develop a certain way, and the estrogens to which females are
exposed in utero cause female brains to develop a different way, if all goes well.
However, if a male (XY) fetus is exposed to high levels of estrogen, he might be
“feminized” and present with certain feminine physical and/or behavioral traits;
and a female (XX) fetus exposed to high levels of androgens could be
“masculinized” and therefore exhibit certain masculine physical and/or
behavioral traits.94 That is the basic BOR story.
Research on humans is much more complex and uncertain than research on
other animals, because it is not possible, given ethical constraints to avoid
causing serious harm to humans, to control many conditions that contribute to
human development. For example, it would be highly unethical to control fetal
exposures to androgen in utero, and observe what happens to a fetus with high

90. Kate Wong, Why Humans Give Birth To Helpless Babies, SCI. AM. (Aug. 28, 2012),
http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/why-humans-give-birth-to-helpless-babies.
91. Id.; JORDAN-YOUNG, supra note 56, at 106, 270–71, 286–91.
92. JORDAN-YOUNG, supra note 56, at 49–50.
93. Id. at 49–50, 280.
94. Id. at 33–40.
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and low exposures. For that reason, brain organization theory works from two
different directions in an attempt to compile a coherent body of evidence.
I will support my claim that brain sex is a myth primarily by drawing from
Brain Storm, sociomedical scientist Rebecca Jordan-Young’s recent, extensive and
rigorous critical analysis of brain organization research studies. As Jordan-Young
explains, there are two types of BOR studies, cohort studies and case-control
studies. The cohort studies work forward from the cause by comparing people
who experienced atypical hormone exposures in utero with people who did
not.95 The case-control studies work backwards from outcomes taken to be
atypical (LGBT subjects, for example) and try to determine whether there were
atypical hormone exposures during gestation. Both methodologies amount to
what Jordan-Young refers to as “quasi-experiments”: in these, it is impossible to
isolate particular variables to study one by one. When relying on quasiexperiments, it is crucial to base interpretations on the overall body of evidence,
and not to lean too heavily on single studies. To be consistent in one’s evaluation,
one must consider together all and only studies that investigate a single
hypothesized cause and a single hypothesized effect. It also becomes especially
important to define one’s terms and to be careful and consistent about one’s
measurements throughout every evaluation of the entire body of data.96
One major problem with BOR is its lack of terminological and conceptual
precision. A variety of terms and concepts have shifted without any
acknowledgment that what a term means now, or what a concept includes, is
different from—even the polar opposite of—what it used to be. Thus, two studies
with opposite results could easily be misread as confirming one another. For
example, in determining whether a female brain was masculinized by a hormone
exposure (such as an androgen), one must have a fixed concept of what it would
mean for a brain to be “masculine” in that respect. BOR researchers claimed that
femininity and masculinity were “common sense ideas” that needed no
definition. Yet in early BOR studies of the 1960s and 1970s, a high level of interest
in (heterosexual) sex was taken to be masculine, such that a female brain was
thought masculinized if the woman showed a high level of interest in sex (with
men). Since the 1980s, however, interest in sex with men has been considered the
hallmark of femininity. So if a woman exhibits a low level of interest in
heterosexual sex, she is taken to be unfeminine, hence, masculinized. So the same
disposition that used to be considered indicative of the masculinization of her
brain later became indicative of normal femininity. It may therefore appear that
both studies indicate that prenatal androgens “masculinize” women’s brains,
even though these studies directly contradict one another. When reading
conclusions in abstracts, the shift in meaning is not apparent, and the studies
may appear to mutually support one another. As Jordan-Young remarks, “Like a
shell game that has gone on too long, not only the observers but also the people
wielding the shells seemed to lose track of what was underneath.”97
95. This could occur because of an intersex condition, because of sharing the uterus with a
fraternal twin of the other sex, or because of a hormone prescription given to one’s biological mother
during pregnancy (e.g., DES to prevent miscarriage). Some studies rely on maternal blood test results
during pregnancy, or on amniotic fluid samples, to infer fetal hormone exposures. Id. at 37.
96. Id. at 45.
97. Id. at 132.
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I will provide one more example of how the conceptual unclarity and
suppressed presumptions (“framing errors”) in BOR have contributed to the
longevity of the myth of brain sex.98 This involves BOR that investigates the
relationship of prenatal hormone exposures to sexual orientation, without
defining what is meant by “sexual orientation.” Is it identified by the sex or
gender of actual partners? Sexual partners or life partners? By self-description?
Or by the degree of desire one exhibits or reports toward members of the same
sex or the other sex?99 Researchers treat these different dimensions as if they
should all be the same, and very often they are not. Because researchers tend to
exclude from their studies subjects who are not consistently gay or lesbian across
these criteria, they exclude most self-described lesbians and many self-described
gay men.100 Once the research subset of gay and lesbian subjects is chosen, one
must wonder what other variables have been selected in or out through this
process. Additionally, when comparing brains or behaviors, researchers do not
directly consider whether it makes sense to treat lesbians and heterosexual men
as a group (because they both are sexually oriented to women), or to treat
lesbians and heterosexual women as a group (because they are both female).
Some studies do one, and others do the other, generally without acknowledging
the choice or difference. BOR does not settle on one strategy or method. Instead,
it mixes and matches these as if it were “fishing” for a correlation; and that is not
good science.101
To compound these deficiencies of BOR, researchers seem to ignore
important recent studies that reveal information that contradicts older studies,
and continue to cite studies that have been discredited, in a feedback loop that
creates an illusion that the discredited studies are still current science. The
soundest studies are not always the most-cited ones. Jordan-Young attributes
that to scientists’ uncritical acceptance of other researchers’ conclusions, which
do not account for shifting definitions or lack of conceptual stability or rigor.
Additionally, when studies hypothesize that prenatal hormone exposures will
result in an atypical outcome that is not found, researchers often decide not to
publish the study. For that reason, a larger proportion of studies appear to
conclude that prenatal hormone exposures lead to sex-typed characteristics than
really is the case.102 Jordan-Young does not believe that BOR researchers
intentionally obstruct scientific progress, but the effects of these practices on the
scientific record are still worrisome.103
When as careful an analysis of relevant brain organization research as
Jordan-Young’s fails to find evidence that would offer any good reason to believe
that prenatal hormone exposures “hardwire” female and male brains
differentially, it seems epistemically irresponsible to fashion our institutions of
medicine and law relying on assumptions about what is natural that are not
supported by good evidence. Instead, it makes sense to treat sex dichotomy and

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

For Jordan-Young’s summary of BOR’s defects, see JORDAN-YOUNG, supra note 56, at 255–68.
Id. at 155–59.
Id. at 173.
Id. at 165.
Id. at 217, 227–28.
Id. at 143.
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gender polarization as social choices, and to defend our choices with good
reasons. If sex or gender were a naturally given dichotomy and one’s brain sex
usually matched one’s dichotomous genital sex, a sizeable percentage of the
numerous studies that have undertaken to prove this would have yielded some
conclusive results. They have not. The burden of proof should be on those who
appeal to natural sex and/or gender to justify the distinction they advocate, and
to justify building it into the basic structure of society.
II. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE GENDER SYSTEM
In part I, I explained the concepts that I rely on, and described the medical
understanding of, and treatment for, intersex and transgender conditions. I noted
the frequently expressed suspicion that sex reassignment surgery (SRS) is aimed
at making a person a “normal” female or male, who is then socially fit to engage
in socially favored heterosexual partnerships, ideally marriage. The medical
community and most ordinary people still appear to believe that for a person to
be mentally healthy the sex of their body must match the gender of their psyche,
or “brain sex.” Having concluded that there is no justifiable reason to believe in
the existence of brain sex, I will now demonstrate how social institutions such as
medicine and law actively construct, maintain, and reinforce the gender system.
Then I will argue that the social construction of gender dichotomy, and even sex
dichotomy, together with the insistence that a person’s traits, dispositions, and
behaviors coherently unify according to the state of one’s genital anatomy or
other innate physical features, do not contribute to human well-being. Instead,
creating and enforcing such dichotomies causes unnecessary pain, contributes to
mental illness, and unjustly constrains individual liberty.
A. How Social Institutions Construct and Enforce Gender
1. Medicine
How does medicine construct a concept of sex as binary and essential?
Through practices described earlier, including this example: the medical
professional attending a birth pronounces the child female or male, even if the
child does not unambiguously fall into one of those categories. Usually that is
done by observing or examining the newborn’s genitals. Recall that when
intersex conditions are present, medical professionals may make the choice
between judging an organ to be a large clitoris (and pronouncing the child
female) or a small penis (and pronouncing the child male).104 When the label of
“female” or “male” does not match up with the child’s characteristics after
puberty, this is generally conceptualized as a mistake in judgment: the medical
professional did not correctly assess the child’s “real” sex, as if there were a right
answer to be found. But what feature is definitive of a person’s sex?
Chromosomes? Hormone profile? Genitals? Personal preference for or comfort
with an identity based on one sex rather than the other? Add to this that there is
no such thing as “brain sex” (brains are not innately sexually differentiated), and
that in a significant percentage of cases genitals are ambiguous. A fair conclusion
is that, without a socially constructed sex dichotomy, every person would be
104.

See discussion supra p. 176.
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recognized as possessing and exhibiting a unique mixture of human
characteristics and attributes. Even those culturally associated with sex and/or
gender do not naturally occur in a bimodal distribution.
2. Law
Few realize how strong a role law has in requiring every person to be
assigned to one of two sexes. Sex dichotomy so permeates our concepts,
language, identity, and awareness that most of us rarely, if ever, notice its
presence or influence. Yet, to take the starkest of examples, there are actually
cases that adjudicate what sex a person is, and statutes that require people to
identify themselves officially as one sex or the other. For example, state vital
records laws require a baby’s sex to be recorded on their birth certificate (causing
much of the urgency surrounding the need to label a baby as one sex or the
other); and until just recently, in the large majority of states that did not
recognize same-sex marriage, persons marrying had to demonstrate through
identification documents that they were different sexes to obtain a marriage
license.
a. Marriage and Family
Consider In re Estate of Gardiner, in which the Kansas Supreme Court
adjudicated the validity of a marriage between the decedent, Marshall Gardiner,
and his widow, J’Noel Ball Gardiner, in order to determine whether J’Noel was
entitled to a share of Marshall’s estate. Marshall was born male, but J’Noel was a
post-surgical male-to-female transsexual woman. The pivotal question was how
the legal definitions of “sex,” “male,” and “female” were to be interpreted. Like
the brain organization researchers described by Jordan-Young,105 legislators had,
in the court’s view, assumed that these were ordinary terms to be given their
plain meaning. After her surgery, Wisconsin permitted J’Noel’s birth certificate
and driver’s license to be amended so that these documents identified her as
female. Nonetheless, the Kansas Court of Appeals treated the question of J’Noel’s
sex as a question of fact, and engaged in a sophisticated analysis of medical and
legal practices relevant for determining gender. It then remanded the case so the
trial court could determine J’Noel’s sex by collecting evidence about the facts that
the Court of Appeals had determined likely to be relevant. However, on further
appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court invalidated the marriage based on its
judgment that J’Noel was not legally female, so the marriage was not between
two persons of different sexes, as Kansas required. The ordinary meaning of the
word “female,” in the court’s view, excluded a person who was transsexual.
Most cases that have considered eligibility for marriage based on biological sex
did not recognize sex reassignment surgery as qualifying a person to marry
someone who would have been the same sex before the surgery.106
But, as one commentator observes, what if J’Noel had married a woman?
Then she might have been told that since her birth certificate and driver’s license
identified her as female, her marriage was invalid. Could it be the case that
105. See discussion supra p. 183.
106. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Gender, Law, and Narrative: Contesting Gender in Popular Culture
and Family Law: Middlesex and Other Transgender Tales, 80 IND. L.J. 391, 431–32 (2005).
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J’Noel, after SRS, was not eligible to marry either a female or a male? That would
be a problematic result, given the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Constitution as guaranteeing persons a fundamental right to marry.107 Consider
another case implicating what the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted as a
fundamental right: parenthood. That right has been so zealously guarded by
courts that children have frequently been harmed by its strength.108 Nonetheless,
Suzanne Daly lost her legal rights as a parent when she transitioned from male (a
“father”) to female. She was neither neglectful nor abusive as a parent, but only
one legal father and one legal mother can be recognized for each child.109 Thus,
Suzanne lost her legal rights as a parent when she became a woman. As should
be clear, even one’s cherished legal rights to form and maintain family
relationships can be jeopardized if one does not comply with the legal
requirement to be female or male.110
b. Employment
Not only can one be excluded from the foundational social association,
family, for changing one’s anatomical sex, but one is alarmingly likely to be
excluded from the means to support oneself via socially respectable and lawful
employment. The transgender unemployment rate has been estimated at about
seventy percent,111 with the result that transgender people are disproportionately
represented among those who earn money through prostitution, selling illegal
drugs, and other unlawful trades.112 They sometimes become connected with
these trades in an effort to obtain black market hormones to accomplish
transition to the other sex without medical assistance, which they sometimes
cannot afford.113 These circumstances lead to a disproportionately high number
of transgender persons in prison, where they are generally housed with persons
of the sex they do not identify as.114
Because Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits sex discrimination
in employment, an employer may not discriminate against an employee based on
their sex, or a condition to which only their sex is subject (e.g., because the
employee is pregnant). Nor may an employer refuse to hire115 or promote female
(or male) employees because they are female (or male); or pay someone less
based on that person’s sex; or fire, demote, or fail to promote a woman because
she is pregnant. But may an employer discriminate against a person because they
refuse to behave in harmony with the sex assigned to them at birth? In 1984, a

107. See id. at 430–31.
108. See generally Melina Constantine Bell, Children Are People: Liberty, Opportunity, and Just
Parenthood, 9 REV. J. POL. PHIL. 49 (2012).
109. Daly v. Daly, 715 P.2d 56, 59 (Nev. 1986).
110. The degree to which nationwide recognition of same-sex marriage will strengthen family
rights for transgender people is still unclear.
111. Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731, 751–52 (2008).
112. See ISRAEL & TARVER, supra note 66, at 17–18.
113. See id. at 19–20.
114. See id. at 19.
115. There are very specific exceptions that are not pertinent here, such as permission to prefer
one sex in a job that requires bathing and dressing someone of that sex, or to be cast as a character of
that person’s sex in an acting role. Here sex is taken to be a bona fide occupational qualification.
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federal appeals court entertained a version of that question in Ulane v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc.116 Born male, Karen Ulane was a flying officer fired by the airline
after undergoing sex reassignment surgery. The district court found Ulane’s
dismissal prohibited by Title VII, reasoning that discrimination based on “sex”
includes discrimination based on “sexual identity.” The district court recognized
that “sex” involves one’s self-concept and social identity, and not just one’s
chromosomes or anatomy. However, the appellate court disagreed, finding that
the plain meaning of “sex” did not extend beyond anatomy. Because Ulane was
not female in the appellate court’s view, she was not discriminated against for
being a woman (or man). Instead, she was discriminated against for being
transsexual; and that, the court held, does not fall within the purview of Title VII.
Five years later, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,117 the U.S. Supreme Court
offered hope that “sex” in Title VII encompasses more than the Ulane court
supposed. In that case, Ann Hopkins was passed over for partnership by the
accounting firm for which she worked because she failed to dress and behave as
femininely as her firm preferred. Hopkins was not, therefore, discriminated
against because she was female, but because she failed to behave in a
stereotypically female fashion. She failed to style her hair, wear makeup, and
walk and talk femininely, for example. The Court remarked that in enacting Title
VII, “Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”118 Because sex stereotypes
regarding behavior and grooming are not based on anatomy, the definition of
“sex” for Title VII purposes appears more expansive than the Ulane
interpretation. If a transwoman failed to behave or dress masculinely—or
behaved and dressed femininely—and was discriminated against, then, it seems
according to Price Waterhouse that Title VII would forbid discrimination against
her on that basis. However, in subsequent federal district decisions, courts
distinguished the cases before them from Price Waterhouse on the basis that
Hopkins was not a transsexual person but an anatomical female. Thus, a
transsexual person could not be protected under Title VII as being discriminated
against because of their anatomical sex; it was their status as transsexual that was
the basis of their discrimination, rather than their sex, and, on these courts’ view,
discrimination against transsexual identity is not included in the plain meaning
of “sex” in Title VII.119
The Ninth Circuit, in Schwenk v. Hartford,120 explicitly interpreted Title VII as
containing an implicit distinction between sex and gender. Sex, according to the
court, refers to one’s biological or anatomical features, whereas gender refers to
socially constructed, and/or individually endorsed, features of femininity and
masculinity. According to its application of Hopkins to cases involving
transsexual persons, such persons were excluded from Title VII not because of
their anatomical sex, but because of their failure to conform to social scripts of
116. 742 F.2d 1081, 1082 (7th Cir. 1984).
117. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
118. Id. at 251 (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)).
119. See generally James v. Ranch Mart Hardware, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 478 (D. Kan. 1995); see also
Broadus v. State Farm Insurance Co., No. 98–4254CVCSOWECF, 2000 WL 1585257 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 11,
2000).
120. 204 F.3d 1187, 1200–02 (9th Cir. 2000).
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masculinity or femininity; so they were discriminated against based on gender,
not sex. However, the Schwenk court interpreted Title VII as forbidding both sex
and gender discrimination. On this reading, it is unlawful to discriminate against
a male and/or man because he fails to be masculine, or against a female and/or
woman because she fails to be feminine. And that is precisely what occurs in
discrimination against transsexual persons. Though the Schwenk court’s
interpretation of Title VII does not serve as precedent that other courts must
follow, because the court’s interpretation of Title VII was tangential to its
decision,121 essentially the same reasoning was used by the Eleventh Circuit to
justify the decision in Glenn v. Brumby.122
Additionally, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has
made discrimination against transgender people one of its strategic priorities.123
Citing Macy v. Holder,124 the EEOC declares: “In 2012, the EEOC held that
discrimination against an individual because that person is transgender (also
known as gender identity discrimination) is discrimination because of sex and
therefore is prohibited under Title VII.” In Macy, the plaintiff had been hired as a
ballistics technician by the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
(ATF), through a private hiring agency. Shortly after Macy informed the agency
that she was transitioning from male to female, they told her that the position for
which she was hired had been eliminated. Actually, the position had been filled
by a different applicant. The EEOC clarified that discrimination based on “sex
stereotyping” and “gender identity,” including transgender status, are forms of
discrimination based on sex, not separate grounds of discrimination. For that
reason, the EEOC interprets them as prohibited by Title VII as sex
discrimination.125
That development is a significant victory for transgender rights.126
Nonetheless, there is still work to be done. Because the EEOC is an executive
branch agency, interpretation of the laws it enforces can change when
Presidential administrations change. The Employment Non-Discrimination Act
(ENDA)127 would offer stronger protection against gender identity and sexual
orientation discrimination in employment if it becomes law. However, as it
currently stands, ENDA still facilitates and permits gender dichotomy.
Employers may require employees “to adhere to the same dress or grooming
standards as apply to the gender to which the employee has transitioned or is

121. See id. In Schwenk, a transgender woman prisoner sued under the Gender Motivated
Violence Act (GMVA), alleging a guard had attempted to rape her. The GMVA does not define
gender, so the court looked to Title VII cases to borrow a definition from a law with a comparable
purpose.
122. See Glenn v. R. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316–17 (11th Cir. 2011). The Sixth Circuit appears to
share this view. See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
123. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT PLAN FY 2013–-2016
(2012), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/sep.cfm.
124. U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, Appeal No. 0120120821 (April 20, 2012).
125. Id.
126. Also noteworthy is President Obama’s Executive Order explicitly prohibiting discrimination
by federal contractors and subcontractors on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity. Exec.
Order No. 13672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,971 (July 23, 2014).
127. The Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S.815, 113th Cong. (2013).
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transitioning,” or the one of birth.128 It also explicitly states that employers are not
required to provide new or additional facilities,129 so gender nonspecific singleuser (or multi-user) bathrooms cannot be demanded. Even this progressive (to
the point of being impossible to pass, most likely) solution under consideration
does not go far enough. One must still identify, and perform consistently, as a
man or a woman to receive ENDA’s protection.130
Additionally, in approximately two-thirds of U.S. states, in most places a
person could live in the U.S., there is no protection against discrimination based
on gender identity, or other laws that would protect access by transgender
people to housing, public accommodations, health care, education, or credit.131
Transsexual persons are still frequently explicitly excluded, or effectively
excluded, from most or all of these social goods, without legal recourse.
c. Identification Documents
Personal identification documents are another pitfall for transgender
128. S. 815 § 8(a).
129. S. 815 § 8(b).
130. This is not practicable, or even possible, for some transsexual persons. Paige Abendroth, for
example, sometimes experiences life as — and identifies as — a woman, and at other times
experiences life as — and identifies as — a man. Others report similar experiences. Radiolab: Invisibilia,
N.Y. PUB. RADIO (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.radiolab.org/story/invisibilia.
131. Eighteen states and the District of Columbia now have laws that protect transgender people
against discrimination in employment, housing, and/or public accommodations. Approximately 200
cities and counties also have legal protections from discrimination based on “gender identity,” which
is generally intended to include transgender persons. Five additional states and several other cities
are under executive orders issued by governors or local officials forbidding discrimination against
state, county or city workers based on gender identity. E.g., Know Your Rights: Transgender People and
the Law, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/know-your-rightstransgender-people-and-law (last visited Aug. 26, 2015). However, nondiscrimination measures to
protect transgender people have faced formidable opposition. Consider a recent ordinance passed by
Charlotte, North Carolina that permitted people to use the public restroom that corresponds with
their gender identity. North Carolina responded by passing a law that not merely requires people to
use only the public restroom designated for the sex specified on their birth certificate, but also
prohibits local anti-discrimination ordinances altogether. E.g., Michael Gordon, Mark S. Price & Katie
Peralta, Understanding HB2: North Carolina’s Newest Law Solidifies State’s Role in Defining
Discrimination, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Mar. 26, 2016 11:00 AM), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/
news/politics-government/article68401147.html. North Carolina’s law is an example of one of the
many so-called religious liberty laws that states have proposed or passed in recent years, some of
which exempt even secular, for-profit businesses from legal obligation to provide goods or services if
doing so burdens their free exercise of religion. There is wide suspicion that these laws are intended
to provide legal protection for those who want to discriminate against people with LGBT identities.
Hunter Schwarz, Indiana Is the Battle Over ‘Religious Freedom’ that Arizona Never Was, WASH. POST
(Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/03/26/indiana-isturning-into-the-battle-over-religious-freedom-that-arizona-never-was. After North Carolina and
Mississippi passed such laws, several large corporations announced plans to withdraw business
from, and several other states implemented travel bans to, these states. E.g., Jonathan M. Katz & Erik
Eckholm, Anti-Gay Laws Bring Backlash in Mississippi and North Carolina, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/us/gay-rights-mississippi-north-carolina.html. Meanwhile,
Georgia’s governor vetoed a similar law after large corporations (such as major sports franchises and
Hollywood celebrities) threatened a boycott. Sandhya Somashekhar, Georgia Governor Vetoes Religious
Freedom Bill Criticized as Anti-gay, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/post-nation/wp/2016/03/28/georgia-governor-to-veto-religious-freedom-bill-criticized-asanti-gay.

Bell Macro (Do Not Delete)

190 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

4/18/2016 3:25 PM

Volume 23:163 2016

persons. The REAL ID Act of 2005132 currently being implemented by states
requires that persons present driver’s licenses or state identification cards to
enter certain federal buildings and to board commercial flights. These
identification documents with enhanced security features must record the
identified person’s full legal name, date of birth, gender (presumably, anatomical
sex), an identifying number, photo, and signature. To verify one’s identification
to obtain a REAL ID, most people will be required to present a birth certificate.
Transgender rights advocates anticipate difficulties for transgender people
whose current gender identity does not match the sex recorded on their birth
certificate.
That concern is not unfounded. Most states that provide a judicial process
whereby a transsexual person can change the sex recorded on their birth
certificate, driver’s license, and/or passport after their transition require that a
medical professional certify that the person’s genital anatomy has been changed
(usually that they have undergone sex reassignment surgery). Four states do not
permit a person to ever change their legal sex, or to amend their birth certificate
to reflect their new identity.133 The state-by-state treatment of sex determination
often results in conflict when a person is born in one state but bears a driver’s
license in another. If the person’s state of residence requires an amended birth
certificate to change the sex designation on their driver’s license, and that
person’s birth state never amends a birth certificate or issues a new one based on
sex reassignment, that person will be stuck with documents that reflect their
birth sex, not their current sexual identity. And that can cause trouble with law
enforcement personnel and with access to various public goods (such as
commercial air travel).
d. Sex Essentialism in the Courts
As Katherine M. Franke pointed out nearly two decades ago, courts tend to
be essentialist about sex.134 That is, they believe there is a natural, biological fact
of the matter about whether a human individual is female or male, and this fact
is taken to be immutable. Courts have been called on to determine a person’s
“real” sex especially in marriage cases, to establish eligibility for marriage given
the different-sex spouse requirement that was once universal in the U.S.135 As
Franke recounts, the first Anglo-American case to adjudicate someone’s sex was
132. Pub. L. No. 109–13, 119 Stat. 302 (2005). See NAT’L GOVERNORS’ ASS’N ET AL., THE REAL ID
ACT: NATIONAL IMPACT ANALYSIS (2006), http://www.ncsl.org/print/statefed/real_id_impact_
report_final_sept19.pdf.
133. Idaho, Kansas, Ohio, and Tennessee do not permit a person ever to amend the sex
designation on their birth certificate to reflect a new sex or gender identity. Lambda Legal, Changing
Birth Certificate Sex Designations: State-By-State Guidelines, http://www.lambdalegal.org/know-yourrights/transgender/changing-birth-certificate-sex-designations (last visited Feb. 26, 2016); see also
Nat’l Ctr. for Transgender Equal., How Trans-Friendly Is the Driver’s License Policy in Your State?
http://www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/ docs/resources/NTDS_Report.pdf (last visited
Feb. 26, 2016); MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, LGBT POLICY TALLY SNAPSHOT,
http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/legal_equality_by_state (last visited Feb. 16, 2016).
134. See Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of
Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 39, 47–48 (1995).
135. See Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556 (U.S. June 26, 2015) (making same-sex marriage
available nationwide on Due Process and Equal Protection grounds).
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Corbett v. Corbett, a 1970 English case in which Arthur Corbett sought a divorce
from his transsexual wife, April Ashley, on grounds that it was never a valid
marriage because she had been and remained male (and thus their marriage was
an ineffective attempt at same-sex marriage). The judge heard a great volume of
medical expert testimony, taking the question of Ashley’s sex to be an objective,
scientific question of fact. He then latched onto expert testimony that genital sex
reassignment surgery does not change sex; it simply helps the patient to live as
the other sex so as to relieve the psychological pain the person experiences when
performing the social role designated by their birth sex. Thus, one always is
“really” the sex they were born, no matter how successfully they alter their
bodies surgically or thorough hormones. In Franke’s words, Ashley was judged a
man not based on her physical genitals, but based on her “cultural genitals,”136 or
“true sex.” Subsequent cases have largely followed suit. For example, in the
previously discussed In re Gardiner,137 the court refers to the transsexual widow
J’Noel’s female anatomy as “all man-made” (and therefore not really female) and
quotes an earlier case from a different state, which rhetorically questioned
whether a surgeon could “change the gender of a person with a scalpel, drugs
and counseling, or is a person’s gender immutably fixed by our Creator at
birth?”138 (That 1999 statement seems to echo an 1873 case in which a woman was
denied admission to the bar in Illinois because the Creator intended for her to be
a wife and mother, rather than to have a career separate from her husband’s,139
demonstrating the robustness of cultural beliefs about biological essentialism and
gender.)
Kenji Yoshino points out the way some courts have shifted from identifying
the legal sex of a transsexual person by referring to the chromosomes or genitals
that make them essentially female or male, to referring to souls or minds, which
are regarded as gendered feminine or masculine.140 While the latter discourse is
an improvement in that it recognizes the person as belonging to the gender to
which they are transitioning or have transitioned, it is still deficient in that it
continues to essentialize gender. Rather than locating a person’s gendered core
identity in a body, the soul/psyche discourse locates it in a soul or mind. Yet that
approach still posits a gendered core identity that is fixed, from which gendered
behavior supposedly emanates.141
From the preceding discussion, it should be clear that law has a powerful
role in dichotomizing sex, and requires every person to be assigned one of two
sexes in order to access essential social goods, including legal protection against
unjust discrimination. Law also serves as gatekeeper in the process for changing
identification from the sex assigned at birth to the other sex, if one prefers it
when one must choose. Legislators, judges, experts and witnesses do not engage
in gender construction and maintenance deliberately or methodically; instead,
136. Franke, supra note 134, at 38–40. Franke herself credits the term to Harold Garfinkel. Id. at
39.
137. See supra pp. 185–86.
138. In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 124 (Kan. 2002) (citing Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223,
224 (Tex. App. 1999)).
139. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141–142 (1872).
140. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L. J. 769, 922 (2002).
141. See id. at 921–23.
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they rely on presumptions and prejudices regarding the naturalness and
necessity of gender, as if it were an inevitable given.
Transgender people, whose personal and social identities are not built
around their birth sex the way conventionally gendered people’s are, are
dehumanized by their inability to squeeze into the exclusive feminine or
masculine gender grooves our society is constructed to maintain. They are
regarded as falling outside the scope of legal protection owed to “real” females
and males: “real” humans, who have a clearly discernible sex. The intricate
details of their anatomies are discussed and assessed by courts in order to
determine what sort of human they are, and whether they can be subsumed
within a human category at all.142
One commentator143 observes that transgender parties to legal cases have
been referred to as if they were Frankenstein’s monster. One court refused to
protect a transsexual woman who was fired because of her transsexual status,
comparing her change from man to woman to a change from man to beast—
specifically, to a donkey—as occurred in Shakespeare’s Midsummer Night’s
Dream.144 Another court, entertaining a petition for a name change, refused to be
involved in a “freakish rechristening,” declaring it irrational to “place a female
name on a male.”145
e. Medicalizing Transgender Identity
Not only are transgender people dehumanized, but when they are treated
as people, their identities are treated as intrinsically pathological. For example,
the Americans with Disabilities Act lists exclusions from coverage.
Transsexualism, transvestism, and gender identity disorders are among these
exclusions, as are pedophilia, pyromania, kleptomania, and conditions arising
from illegal drug use. Transsexualism, transvestism, and gender identity
disorders, in juxtaposition to behaviors associated with criminal activity, are
pathologized by implication.146
Most transsexual people must receive a diagnosis of “gender dysphoria”
from a medical professional to legally obtain hormones, surgeries, or other
treatments to make their appearance conform to expectations for their preferred

142. Court cases have “plac[ed] [a transgender person’s] genitals on trial,” entertaining such
details as whether the party urinated seated or standing, what sexual practices that person engaged
in with their spouse, whether their genitals had a “good cosmetic appearance” and were “adequate
for . . . traditional penile/vaginal intercourse.” Ezie, supra note 64, at 162–63 (quoting Kantaras v.
Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA, at *47–51 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003) and M. T. v. J. T., 355 A.2d 204, 206
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976)).
143. See Abby Lloyd, Defining the Human: Are Transgender People Strangers to the Law? 20 BERKELEY
J. GENDER L. & JUST. 150, 159–62 (2013).
144. Id. at 160–61 (quoting Ashlie v. Chester-Upland School District, No. 78-4037, 1979 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12516, at *13 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 1979)).
145. Id. at 161–62 (quoting In re Petition of Richardson to Change Name, 23 Pa. D. & C.3d 199
(1982)).
146. The ADA specifically provides that “the term ‘disability’ shall not include (1) transvestism,
transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting from
physical impairments, or other sexual behavior disorders; (2) compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or
pyromania; or (3) psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from current illegal use of drugs.”
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b) (2009), amended by P.L. 110-325 (2008).
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gender (or, recall, even to obtain proper identification documents).147 They may
receive these treatments and insurance coverage for them when it is available,
but only if the treatments are “medically necessary,” meaning that without the
treatments they would be ill.148 Thus, transsexual people must prove that they
are ill in order to conform to the cultural requirement that body sex match
psyche gender.
Israel and Tarver’s transgender care guidelines, mentioned earlier, go so far
as to provide a sample letter for physicians to write for their patients, explaining
that their patient has gender identity disorder (the diagnosis that gender dysphoria
has supplanted) and that part of their medically necessary treatment is to live as
a member of their non-birth sex.149 The patient can show that letter to law
enforcement personnel who believe they are committing some sort of fraud or
unlawful impersonation, and to employers who may object to their appearance
and presentation. The need for such a letter to avoid these social difficulties that
conventionally-gendered people do not face demonstrates how institutionalized
gender is, and how otherized and pathologized nonconforming gender identities
are.
Moreover, as some attorneys who represent transgender clients point out,
many clients do not have the financial means to pay for physician visits or
expensive treatments.150 Others do not wish to have these treatments, but simply
wish to express their transgender identities in other ways.151 And many, if not
most, do not experience “clinically significant distress or impairment in social,
occupational, or other important areas of functioning,”152 as a result of their
gender identity, only as a result of the ostracism and discrimination heaped upon
them because of it.153 What seems here pathological, and in need of cure, is not
the transgender person but the society that subjects the transgender person to
ostracism and discrimination.
f. Caste Systems Enforced By U.S. Law
As has occasionally been observed,154 the essentialized and naturalized legal
presumptions about gender and sex rather closely parallel earlier presumptions,
now debunked and rejected, about the supposed biological basis of racial
identities. Gender and race are both caste systems, classifying persons in order to
assign them a place in the social hierarchy. Not all caste systems are binary, but
race and gender in the U.S. both have been that way.155 During slavery and

147. See supra Part II.A.2.c.
148. See ISRAEL & TARVER, supra note 66, at 18; see also DSM-IV-TR, supra note 34, at 581.
149. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
150. Lloyd, supra note 143, at 176, 194.
151. Id. at 185–86.
152. DSM-V, supra note 79, at 453.
153. See, e.g., Lloyd, supra note 143, at 175–76.
154. See, e.g., Ezie, supra note 64; Franke, supra note 134; Andrew Gilden, Toward a More
Transformative Approach: The Limits of Transgender Formal Equality, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 83
(2008).
155. Of course, there are different ways of looking at it, but in law it has generally been treated as
binary. Anne Fausto-Sterling identifies six gender classifications that emerged in the U.S. Over time
these have come to be regarded as natural or scientifically based: heterosexual men, heterosexual
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segregation, there were only two races: white and colored one of which was
recorded on public documents, including, in many localities, birth certificates
and marriage certificates. That is exactly what is almost without exception done
with sex in the U.S.: one’s sex is recorded on one’s birth certificate, school
registration, driver’s license, etc. as either female or male. Anti-miscegenation
laws used to require that two persons have the same race recorded on their birth
certificates before they could be issued a marriage license. That remained true
with sex in the U.S. until very recently: one’s birth certificate had to certify that
one’s sex was different from the one recorded on the prospective spouse’s birth
certificate.156
During racial segregation, more and more immigrants arrived on U.S.
shores, and it became necessary to decide whether they were “colored” or
“white” for the purposes of segregation laws, marriage laws, etc. What were
American Indians, Mexicans, Asian Indians, Koreans? These racial identities
were sometimes litigated, just as litigation occurs now over whether someone is
legally female or male. Just like sex categories, binary race categories are not
dictated by nature; their classifications are social choices, and social institutions
and the people who administer them can choose any number of different
classification schemes. The required categories are not scientific, but ideological.
That perhaps should have become apparent when lawmakers were faced with
the choice of squeezing Asian people (for example) into the “colored” and
“white” categories, and it should now be apparent that not all people are one of
two possible sexes—or remain the same, unambiguous sex—from birth to death.
One might also begin to wonder why the state needs to create, litigate, and
record these sorts of distinctions, rather than merely to recognize that they exist
(when necessary) to remedy the injustices that they have caused in the past
and/or continue to cause.
g. The Civil Rights Model for Addressing Transgender Discrimination
The civil rights model of jurisprudence has significantly mitigated racial
discrimination, especially overt discrimination. This model rests on the idea of a
“protected class,” which is a presumptively invalid basis for government, and
often private, discrimination. As discussed earlier, sex is also regarded as a
protected class (although it receives less rigorous constitutional protection than
race). Both are protected in part because they are “immutable” or highly visible,
are recognized as unrelated to one’s social deservingness, and have served as the
basis of unjust discrimination or prejudice in the past.157 Like race, one’s sex may
or may not be “highly visible.” When we notice a person’s sex, we are not
observing their genitals or hormones or chromosomes: we are noticing the way
they dress and behave, and if by “sex” we mean some anatomical feature, that is
not likely to be highly visible. The difficulty with providing protection on the
basis of immutability is the underlying implication that if the person could

women, gay men, lesbians, bisexual men, and bisexual women. See ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING
THE BODY: GENDER POLITICS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY 11 (2000).
156. Appleton, supra note 106, at 430–31.
157. Protected classes must also be a discrete and insular minority, lacking the political clout to
effect social change without the institutional support of nondiscrimination laws.
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change the feature, society might demand that they change it.158 Imagine
someone being told that if she wishes to dress like a woman, she must have
genital surgery in order to avoid discrimination; or that she must bleach her skin,
if she wishes to avoid racial discrimination; or that she must change her religion
if she wishes to avoid discrimination on the basis of her religion.
Part of the reason why intersex people are often treated with more
compassion and social affirmation than transsexual people is that their condition
is regarded as “not their fault” because they could not have chosen it. For the
same reason, many gay and lesbian rights advocates hope that same-sex sexual
orientation can be proven genetic or biological. When a characteristic that
offends people is regarded by them as immutable or nonvoluntary, they are far
more likely to tolerate or accept those with the characteristic. Transsexual
persons are often not legally recognized as the sex with which they identify
because they are regarded as making an imprudent or illegitimate choice. But if
one’s sex is not a natural fact, why should one’s society get to choose one’s sex
for one, instead of the person most affected by their sex identity choosing for
themselves?
I will address that very question in more depth. First, however, I wish to
develop the institutional racism-sexism analogy further using the example of
Rogers v. American Airlines, a case widely criticized for failing to appreciate the
social meaning of race in its institutional context. In Rogers, an African-American
employee was dismissed for wearing her hair in cornrows, which was prohibited
by company policy.159 She sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, alleging
that her dismissal constituted racial discrimination. The court decided against
her because it found that the discrimination was not based on her immutable or
intrinsic African-American features, but on her hairstyle, which could be
changed.160 But one might ask: why were cornrows prohibited in the first place?
The reason that seems most likely to many commentators is that Rogers’s
immutable blackness would be tolerated, provided she did not “act” black when
it was within her control to “act black” or “act white.” To the extent possible,
American Airlines was requiring its employees to conduct themselves according
to “white” norms, even though it would employ nonwhites willing to conform to
those norms.161
That same requirement has often been noted in cases of gender: women
may not be treated differently because they have two X chromosomes or a
uterus, but it is not sex discrimination to require hours incompatible with family
responsibilities, to give preferences to veterans despite decades of discrimination
against women in the military, or to promote only those who are perceived as
both competent and likeable, which women almost never are. Only if you can act
like a man as a woman, or act “white” as an African-American, will you receive
legal protection against discrimination. And as a transsexual person, you might
be able to obtain reinstatement to your employment, providing that you
158. Kenji Yoshino refers to this as a demand to “convert” from the stigmatized identity to the
socially favored identity. Yoshino, supra note 140, at 772.
159. Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y 1981).
160. Id. at 232–33.
161. Kenji Yoshino refers to this as a demand to “cover”: that is, to downplay aspects of one’s
identity that are stigmatized within one’s society. Yoshino, supra note 140, at 772.
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convincingly perform your chosen gender at all times in a way consistent with
heterosexual norms.162 Show any ambiguity, and you may be facing perfectly
legal discrimination against a transsexual person, who in many ways lacks
standing as a legal person.163
B. How a Coercive Gender System Contributes to Mental Illness and Unjustly
Constrains Liberty
I have demonstrated some ways that institutions of medicine and law
create, maintain, and enforce a binary gender system. I next explain how socially
enforced rules about gender contribute to mental illness. Following that
explanation, I will demonstrate how government, which organizes society, fails
to respect citizens’ liberty when it creates, maintains, and enforces a gendered
social order.
1. How a Gender System Contributes to Mental Illness
Gender structures increase the prevalence of mental illness in many ways,
aggravating a serious social problem. More than half of adults become seriously
mentally ill at some point in their lives, and many people have repeated or
frequent episodes of mental illness.164 Not only does that cause a great deal of
suffering, but it is socially costly in terms of work time lost, lower productivity,
health care costs, etc. Social expenditures to address widespread mental illness
consume social resources that otherwise could be used to alleviate poverty, cure
disease, develop renewable energy sources, and so on.165
Sociologist, researcher, and mental health advocate Corey Keyes defines
mental illness as “a persistent and substantial deviation from normal
functioning” that “impairs the execution of social roles (e.g., employee) and is
associated with mental suffering.”166 Keyes’s professional interest is to provide a
162. Andrew Gilden illustrates this beautifully in a discussion of Paisley Currah’s comparison of
two cases with opposite outcomes, both involving transgender teenagers. In the first case (Doe v.
Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199 (Mass. Super. 2000)), a transgender teenage girl’s school did not allow her
to attend classes while wearing feminine clothing. The court found the school’s conduct unlawful
because it threatened harm to Doe’s psychological health, given that she had received a diagnosis of
gender identity disorder and part of her medical treatment regimen was to dress femininely. By
contrast, in Youngblood v. School Board of Hillsborough Cty. (Case No. 8:02-CV-1089-T-24MAP,
(M.D. Fla. Sept. 25, 2002)), Youngblood, a teenage girl who rejected feminine gender presentation,
was excluded from her senior portrait because she wore the dress prescribed for boys instead of girls.
She asserted her right to free expression under the First Amendment as well as sex discrimination.
The court dismissed both of her claims. The perceived voluntariness of Youngblood’s conduct,
compared with Doe’s conduct, seems to be what produced the divergent results. Gilden, supra note
154, at 113–16.
163. Kenji Yoshino argues for a new civil rights paradigm, which presumes (subject to rebuttal)
that conditioning the enjoyment of social goods on a stigmatized person’s assimilation to majority
norms of identity and/or behavior constitutes unlawful discrimination. That is, people should be
legally protected against unreasonable or arbitrary demands to cover (see text accompanying notes
158 & 161 for a description of these demands). KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON
OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 184–96 (2006).
164. Corey L.M. Keyes, The Mental Health Continuum: From Languishing to Flourishing in Life, 43 J.
HEALTH & SOC. RES. 207, 207 (2002).
165. Id.
166. Id. The U.S. Surgeon General defines mental health as “a state of successful performance of
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positive account of mental health, rather than defining it essentially as the
absence of mental illness. To do this, he creates a model with two continua, one
for mental health and one for mental illness. The two extremes of the mental
health scale are flourishing and languishing, while the two extremes of the mental
illness scale are mentally ill and mentally healthy. Thus, a person can be mentally
healthy but languishing, or mentally ill but still flourishing at a given point in
time. Keyes argues that society should not only seek to treat mental illness, but
should also promote positive mental health in order to reduce the prevalence of
mental illness, since the chances of becoming mentally ill are greatly reduced for
people who are flourishing. Even for those who are mentally ill, flourishing
counteracts some of the more serious effects of mental illness, just as having high
HDL cholesterol counteracts the bad effects of high LDL cholesterol.167 Because
new mental illness arises and relapses occur faster than society can treat the
existing mental illness at a given time, the only way to put a dent in the
staggering prevalence of mental illness is to engage in prevention, rather than
merely treating mental illness reactively when it occurs.168
Mental health involves positive mental states and positive functioning,
which Keyes divides into six aspects: “self-acceptance, positive relations with
others, personal growth, purpose in life, environmental mastery, and
autonomy.” Keyes elaborates on what these entail: “That is, individuals are
functioning well when they like most parts of themselves, have warm and
trusting relationships, see themselves developing into better people, have a
direction in life, are able to shape their environments to satisfy their needs, and
have a degree of self-determination.”169 Keyes also identifies five dimensions of
social well-being, which together with the six dimensions of psychological wellbeing, are used to assess individual functioning and to locate it on the mental
health continuum.
These social dimensions consist of social coherence, social actualization, social
integration, social acceptance, and social contribution. Individuals are
functioning well when they see society as meaningful and understandable, when
they see society as possessing potential for growth, when they feel they belong to
and are accepted by their communities, when they accept most parts of society,
and when they see themselves contributing to society.170

A well-designed study of 1,850 American adults found that the most
dysfunctional demographic groups—with significant depression and
languishing—were women, young people, divorced people, and people with the
fewest years of education.171 Given the measures of both psychological and social
well-being, it is not surprising that women should fare poorly in these regards in
a society with a sex hierarchy that subordinates women. But just as importantly,
mental function, resulting in productive activities, fulfilling relationships with people, and the ability
to adapt to change and to cope with adversity.” Id. at 208.
167. Corey L.M. Keyes, To Happiness and Beyond: Flourishing in Life and Real Healthcare
Reform, Address at Washington and Lee University (March 11, 2013). Keyes offered this analogy
during this public lecture.
168. Keyes, supra note 164, at 209–10.
169. Id. at 208–09.
170. Id. at 209.
171. The MacArthur Foundation’s Midlife in the United States survey. Id. at 211.
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gender polarization itself interferes with mental health along most of Keyes’s
eleven dimensions, to say nothing of the negative effect it obviously can have on
the subjective mental states of anyone who is not conventionally gendered, given
the problems it can cause with employment security and satisfaction, and ability
to be part of a socially sanctioned family.
a. Dimensions of Psychological Well-being
Gender nonconformists include not only transgender people, but all people
whose core inclinations or preferred activities are not regarded as gender
appropriate. Understood that way, many people—perhaps most—are gender
nonconformists in some respects or at some times. However, those for whom
gender nonconformity is a significant aspect of their lives often struggle with
self-acceptance, given their deviation from a rigid social norm. Positive relations
with others can become difficult, for the gender nonconformist, with those who
police gender, as most people do. Frequently close family members such as
parents, siblings, and spouses engage in gender policing. For people who are
transgender, society makes it very difficult to establish a socially sanctioned
family, often the most important locus for positive relations.
Personal growth can be hampered by gender grooves for all people,
whether or not they are gender nonconformists, since they are discouraged from
developing traits or skills that are not regarded as appropriate for a person of
their sex. A person’s purpose in life is also likely to be constrained by gender
grooves. For example, women often see their exclusive or primary purpose as
nurturing others, which can displace other possible purposes that are wide open
to men, including men who highly value family relationships and engage in
significant nurturing. Finding a purpose in life can be complicated for
transgender people because of the social discrimination and disapproval that
interfere with achievement of their ends. This also relates to autonomy: those low
on the gender hierarchy (women, gay men, transgender people) are constantly
swimming against the same current that smoothly conducts heterosexual men
toward their chosen destinations. And because of that current—an institutional
framework built to facilitate heterosexual men’s pursuit of the activities they
value—those lower on the gender hierarchy tend to have great difficulty with
environmental mastery. The poor fit between many people’s gender identities
and the androcentric, gender polarized, heterosexist institutional framework, is
something of which most people disadvantaged by it are well aware, even if they
cannot articulate the problem. The frustration it can cause threatens to
undermine the psychological well-being of women, gay men, transgender
people, and no doubt others.
Society’s institutional structure denigrates people’s identities, and thereby
undermines their psychological well-being. They may be unable to like most
parts of themselves because society’s message is that they are inferior beings. It is
difficult for people to have warm and trusting relationships with others to whom
they must remain closeted, or with whom they will not be recognized as
establishing a socially sanctioned family, or with a person who beats or rapes
them because they are regarded as a servant, a sexual object, and/or property. To
the extent gender nonconformists regard themselves as developing into better
people, often it is because they are resisting oppressive social norms, and as a

Bell Macro (Do Not Delete)

4/18/2016 3:25 PM

GENDER ESSENTIALISM AND AMERICAN LAW

199

result many others will perceive them as becoming worse people. A gender
nonconformist may be perceived by others as “better” if, exhausted from
swimming against the tide, the person acquiesces to subordination or resigns to
staying in the closet, which decreases the amount of social conflict caused by the
gender nonconformity. Thus, gender nonconformists must constantly manage
the tension between two aspects of being a good person: maintaining integrity
and being socially cooperative.
Anyone can have a direction in life at some time, but those whose
aspirations are stifled by gender norms might have to set sights lower to
accomplish anything at all of value. Consider, for example, the pre-med student
who decides not to attend medical school when she fully realizes the difficulty
she will face balancing her career with family responsibilities, a choice men
almost never make. Or the teenager who wants to be a clergyman of his faith, but
realizes he is gay and learns that his faith does not accept gay clergy. Related to
this are people’s ability to shape their environments to satisfy their needs and to
have a significant degree of self-determination. When the environment forces
women to choose between family and career, and legally denies people
employment because of their sexual orientation, their ability to shape their
environments to satisfy their needs is significantly reduced. While the pre-med
student and the teenager have some degree of self-determination, it is a small
degree—a far smaller degree than the heterosexual men at the top of the gender
hierarchy have—and comparatively speaking the student and teenager have
insufficient opportunities for self-determination.
Thus, as we can see, gender polarization threatens to undermine the
psychological well-being of at least those who are not heterosexual men— more
than half the population—and probably also of heterosexual men (who, for
example, are discouraged from seeking treatment for mental illness, are expected
to suppress their emotions, etc.). According to the DSM V, adults and adolescents
who experience a mismatch between their socially imposed gender identity and
preferred gender identity (i.e., people with gender dysphoria), prior to gender
reassignment, “are at increased risk for suicidal ideation, suicide attempts, and
suicides. After gender reassignment, adjustment may vary, and suicide risk may
persist.”172 Thus, people’s mental health can be expected to improve—and
mental illness to diminish—probably dramatically, if the institutional gender
hierarchy is dismantled.
It is important to be clear that women, gay men, and others disadvantaged
by the gender hierarchy can be mentally healthy and can flourish in a society
such as ours, despite the absence of gender justice. People are resilient, and as
struggles such as the women’s rights movement, civil rights movement, and
marriage equality movements demonstrate, are capable not only of adapting
effectively to difficult conditions, but also of fighting against oppression and
securing significant wins. However, I wish to reiterate173 that the ability of some
people to adapt to injustice and/or to resist oppression does not justify
hierarchical and/or oppressive social arrangements, and does not vitiate our
social or individual obligations to reform society by eliminating harmful and
172.
173.

DSM-V, supra note 79, at 454.
For the earlier discussion, see supra p. 170.
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oppressive hierarchies.
b. Dimensions of Social Well-being
Gender polarization interferes, not only with people’s psychological wellbeing, but also with their social well-being. It jeopardizes social coherence for
many people, who do not view society as meaningful and understandable.
College women often cannot understand why they have to be so careful about
not “hooking up” with too many men, because it will ruin their reputation, when
hooking up with a lot of women enhances men’s reputations. Mothers puzzle
over why, when they work full time just like their husbands, they are the ones
the school calls when a child is ill or in trouble; and why they are expected to
make the dish for the church potluck, empty the dishwasher, and manage the
family schedule. Transgender people cannot understand why people are angry at
them for using the men’s room or the women’s room, especially in places where
there is no gender neutral alternative. Gay men and lesbians wondered for
decades whether social actualization—the potential for growing in society—was
possible for them when they were not permitted to marry the person they loved
and start a family because that person was the “wrong” sex. Even with same-sex
marriage nationally recognized, many barriers remain to social actualization for
people who do not regard themselves as heterosexual. Women doubt they can be
socially actualized when they cannot have a satisfying career and family life,
given that most people’s conception of the good includes both of these.
Social integration, the sense of belonging and acceptance in one’s
community, is impossible for many, if not most, transgender people, since so
many communities do not accept transgender people at all. Although gay men
and lesbians, and same-sex couples are gaining greater acceptance in the U.S.,
many would still prefer to deny them access to the foundational unit of society,
the family; and in most states, they cannot rely on legal protection from sexual
orientation discrimination in the workplace or elsewhere.174 That tends to
prevent full social integration. Even heterosexual mothers may have difficulty
with social integration, since if they are married they may face disapproval for
working full time, and if they are single they may face disapproval for not doing
so, even though safe, affordable child care remains unavailable for many.
Social acceptance—that a person accepts most parts of society—probably
applies to most people, even those whose lives are made disproportionately
difficult by gender polarization, economic inequality, racism, ableism, and other
social failures. I would argue, though, that people should not be as accepting as
they are of these injustices and social flaws. Many socially disadvantaged people
view themselves as defective, rather than seeing the society around them as
defective. They ask themselves: Why can’t I balance career and family, when so
many other people seem to be able to? Why was I born with a mind that does not
match my anatomy? And so forth. Moreover, even those who recognize its flaws
are probably inclined to believe that “most parts” of society are acceptable,
despite these many problems. However unreflective or even false, that belief

174. See MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 133 (detailing laws and policies in each
state related to equality for LGBT individuals, including laws that address marriage recognition,
adoption and parenting, and identification documents).

Bell Macro (Do Not Delete)

4/18/2016 3:25 PM

GENDER ESSENTIALISM AND AMERICAN LAW

201

nevertheless permits social acceptance for most people.
Finally, social contribution—the view of oneself as a (presumably positive)
contributor to society—is almost certainly undermined by denial of access to the
institution of family which some transgender people still face. Gay, lesbian, and
transgender people have significantly limited opportunities for social
contribution in states where their protection from employment discrimination is
uncertain. So clearly, gender polarization interferes significantly with people’s
social well-being.
Furthermore, as the DSM V notes:
Gender dysphoria, along with atypical gender expression, is associated with high
levels of stigmatization, discrimination, and victimization, leading to negative
self-concept, increased rates of mental disorder comorbidity, school dropout, and
economic marginalization, including unemployment, with attendant social and
mental health risks, especially in individuals from resource-poor family
backgrounds. In addition, these individuals’ access to health services and mental
health services may be impeded by structural barriers, such as institutional
discomfort or inexperience in working with this patient population.175

Thus, we can see that gender polarization operates to threaten or
compromise the mental health of many women, gay men, and transgender
people, and probably others, by undermining their psychological and social wellbeing, as well as by leaving them with frequent or persistent negative emotional
attitudes.
2. How Creation and Enforcement of Gender Unjustly Constrains Liberty
Let us now turn to my claim that when the government, which organizes
society, creates, maintains, and enforces a gendered social order, it deprives
people of the respect that democratic governments owe to their citizens, and it
unjustly and unnecessarily constrains their liberty.
a. Dworkin’s Personal Versus External Preferences
To demonstrate what I mean, I will borrow a useful distinction offered by
legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin distinguishes between personal
preferences and external preferences to explain why utilitarian politics can reach
inequitable results by inadvertently double-counting certain preferences and
discounting others.176 Personal preferences pertain to one’s own ability to obtain
certain goods and/or opportunities; they are self-regarding.177 External
preferences are preferences about how goods and/or opportunities are made
available to others; they are other-regarding preferences. Sometimes these are
inextricably related, because extensions of my opportunities or access to goods
will affect the availability of these goods and opportunities to others. For
example, if I am competing for an employment position, I prefer that I am the
one to receive it (personal preference), and therefore I prefer that my rival not
receive it. However, my preference that a certain person not receive a position

175.
176.
177.

DSM-V, supra note 79, at 458.
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 234–38 (1977).
Id. at 234–35.
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would be an external preference if I simply held it out of dislike for the applicant,
and not out of concern for how that person’s obtaining the position might affect
my ability to do so.178
As Dworkin notes, external preferences arising from prejudice are
particularly difficult to separate from personal preferences.179 For example, if I
am prejudiced against people who do not sound like native English speakers
when they talk, I might prefer that a person who sounds this way to me not be
hired as my coworker, even though such a hire would not affect or would
positively affect my ability to perform my own work well. If my preference
counted in my company’s hiring practices, particularly if many of my coworkers
shared that preference, a more qualified candidate could be excluded from
employment at my company for reasons that are unfair, unjustifiable, and
inefficient. Such preferences should not count when weighing aggregate
preferences to reach an optimal decision; they impede, rather than facilitate, the
objective: hiring the best candidate for the job. Furthermore, they are unfair to
the candidate, whose chance for the job should depend on their job-related
merits, not merely on whether potential coworkers hold an irrational prejudice
against them. This situation is particularly stark when the prejudice in question
is “widespread and pervasive,” as was the prejudice against African-Americans
that supported segregation laws.180 It is unjust for a majority to impose
disadvantages on a minority simply because individuals in the majority share a
prejudice against members of the minority, and share a willingness to impose
disadvantages on them.
Using that principle, if I preferred for a person to conform to gender
stereotypes determined by their sex of birth, my preference would be merely
external. Others’ visible rejection of, or self-presentation incompatible with
gender stereotypes or notions of binary and/or immutable sex, do not affect my
own ability to form and express my identity in the way that I prefer. Supporting
social institutions and policies that disadvantage transgender people would
impose my own preference on them, limiting their freedom in a significant way,
without expanding mine in any significant way. Suppose that you would be
happy living in a yellow house and that you find many of the other colors people
commonly paint houses repulsive. Would you support a law requiring everyone
to paint their house yellow?181 Would the fact that you share a preference with
many other people justify your imposition of that preference on others, and the
consequent limitation of their freedom to satisfy their own preferences? Imagine
persons behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance,182 unable to know what their
178. Id.
179. Id. at 236.
180. Id. at 236–38.
181. Some zoning ordinances resemble this kind of rule. However, such ordinances are generally
limited to small areas, and anyone who does not wish to live under the restrictions can reasonably
choose not to move into the zone.
182. Rawls explicates his theory of justice, justice as fairness, using a hypothetical social contract.
In this model, the parties to the hypothetical contract are positioned behind a veil of ignorance, and
assigned the task of choosing principles to govern the basic structure of their society. This is known
as the “original position.” Behind the veil of ignorance, parties know nothing about their own
personal characteristics or preferences, or about the particular circumstances of their society. The
principles that the parties would choose must be fair, in Rawls’s view, because no one is in a position
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preferences regarding house colors will turn out to be once the veil is lifted,
authorizing a law requiring houses to be painted yellow. It seems unimaginable.
Yet, house colors are insignificant compared to the sorts of restrictions on
personal choice that would be permitted if people knowingly and deliberately
accepted, as a just and legitimate exercise of majority rule, that everyone must
live according to the majority’s preferences.
One might argue that while the yellow-house rule is clearly a silly rule,
people’s policy preferences regarding ethical matters are different in kind. They
are not mere irrational preferences, but deeply held beliefs about what a good
society is, and what sort of society they wish to live in. According to Dworkin,
there may well be a “public morality” that is justly enforceable.183 Consider, for
example, the principles embodied by the U.S. Constitution. As Dworkin
plausibly claims, one principle of public morality is that voters and lawmakers
should not restrict people’s liberty in order to indulge their own prejudices and
personal aversions.184 Policy can legitimately reflect community morality, but
community morality should not consist in common or even universal
prejudices.185 We, as a community, should be able to give reasons for having the
moral principles we have, and these reasons should appeal to principles all of us
share as a society (that is, they cannot be based on religious, moral or
philosophical doctrines that many of us reject).186 What moral principle or reason
could support the social and legal requirement to conform one’s behavior to a
particular social script, based on an accident of one’s birth, as a pre-requisite for
enjoying the rights, privileges, and social goods to which one is entitled as a
member of society? No such moral principle or reason can be derived from
public morality in the U.S.
We can derive the opposite principle from public morality, legal history,
and traditions of the U.S.: the principle that social advantages should have a
basis in individual merit or choices. Assignment of social role based on one’s
circumstances of birth, by contrast, is a feudal principle opposed to the practice
of meritocracy, which assigns social benefits and obligations either equally for
all, or unequally but tailored appropriately to reflect the relevant skill, effort, or
type of obligation that makes one deserving of the benefit, or bound by the
duty.187 Another widely accepted public principle is that people should be
allowed as much freedom as possible to develop their own identities, characters,
projects, and plans, consistent with others’ ability to do the same.188 Thus, the
traditional principles of meritocracy and individual freedom both count against

to choose principles to benefit themselves (given that they do not know what would benefit them).
The original position is carefully designed to be a perfectly impartial standpoint that will yield pure
procedural justice. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136–42 (1971); JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS
FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 85–89 (2001).
183. DWORKIN, supra note 176, at 262–64.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 259–65.
186. Id.
187. I do not mean to claim that the U.S. is a meritocracy: only that meritocracy is a principle of
morality in the U.S., however imperfectly realized (or unrealized).
188. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 5, 13, 18–21, 109–20 (Henry Regnery Co. 1955) (1859); see also
JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 111–15 (Erin Kelly ed., Harvard Univ. Press 2001).
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institutionalized, coercively assigned, and enforced gender roles. The only
apparent reason why gender requirements continue to be institutionalized and
enforced today is that they continue to appeal to the prejudices of the majority.
And as we have seen, majority preference based on prejudice is not a defensible
reason for public policy.
b. Laden’s Right to Choose Personal Identity
Not only does socially institutionalized and legally enforced gender
constitute objectionable government enforcement of prejudiced external majority
preferences, but it also reflects an egregious failure of government to respect as
full citizens transgender persons and other persons who do not wish to conform
to social norms about gender. In Reasonably Radical, an attempt to reconcile
liberalism and the politics of identity, Anthony Simon Laden argues, correctly in
my view, that it is unjust to socially impose nonpolitical identities on citizens;
people ought to have a say about what their personal identities are.189 Laden is
concerned with social institutions and policies that force people to conform their
identities in a way they find distorting in order to be included politically.190
Recall that is exactly what the law forces transgender people to do: Identify as a
man or as a woman (almost always based on sex assignment at birth) or give up
the rights you otherwise would have to be employed, to use public
accommodations, and to retain legal parenthood status with respect to your
children. Assimilate or face social exclusion.
As Laden demonstrates, people who are assigned identities (such as race
and gender identities) that are rigidly defined and hierarchically arranged in our
society are not in a position to relate as one citizen to another.191 In a liberal
democracy, that circumstance undermines political legitimacy.192 If the positions
of parties who are supposed to be deliberating are sufficiently unequal in power,
the less powerful party does not have a meaningful opportunity to reject the
other party’s proposals, and this coercive structure makes genuine mutual
agreement impossible. Laden designates the circumstances where that occurs
“social exclusion.”193 He explains:
When an aspect of someone’s identity is imposed, the source of the authority of
the reason is not her own identification but the determination of her deliberative
partner. When we stand in such a relationship with others, we are prevented
from forming a political relationship with them that is characterized by freedom
and equality. . . . When an aspect of my identity is imposed, there is a set of
claims I am assumed to have accepted. My actual rejection of these claims will be
ignored or taken as evidence of my unreasonableness. Since I have no say over
the authority of these claims, no relationship I form in which these claims are

189. See ANTHONY SIMON LADEN, REASONABLY RADICAL: DELIBERATIVE LIBERALISM AND THE
POLITICS OF IDENTITY 134–48 (2001).
190. Id. at 137–39.
191. Id. at 17–19.
192. See id. at 19.
193. In the case of transgender persons, Laden’s account of legal exclusion is also apt. The
example he gives is that only men are subject to military conscription. For that reason, men’s opinions
about whether to go to war are taken to have greater weight, and men’s protests against war have
more influence. Id. at 137–39.
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made can be considered free. . . . In rejecting a claim made upon me, I will appear
to be attempting to reject an obligation that follows from an identity that is in fact
mine. The constraint on my freedom in such a case comes at the level of an
effective prohibition on my ability to challenge the relevance of the identity itself,
or to challenge the particular shape it has been given. In looking only at the
particular deliberation in question, however, we may easily miss this limitation,
either because those deliberating have internalized the identity and the claims
about its relevance, or because others have been trained to see the identity as
obviously relevant and to look upon anyone who would question that fact as
themselves unreasonable.194

Thus, if we take for granted the necessity or propriety of binary gender
roles, based on the sex assigned at birth, then the claim that a transwoman (and
everyone else) is assumed to have accepted is: no woman has a penis. When a
transwoman explicitly rejects that assumption, she is regarded as mistaken,
crazy, unreasonable. When she disagrees with her deliberative partner’s claim
that she should not wear a dress or use a women’s restroom, her partner does not
regard her claim about her identity with respect. And why should any
deliberative partner respect her claim that she is a woman, when her identity has
been legally constructed as “man” or as “monster,” not as woman? The social
exclusion is legally sanctioned. There is nothing the transwoman can say to
persuade her deliberative partner to regard her as an equal whose claims are
worthy of consideration, and whose reasons demand reasons in response,
instead of rejection out of hand as preposterous.
Laden proposes amending the U.S. Constitution to include a provision that
would protect citizens’ right to live in harmony with the reasonable195
nonpolitical identities they choose, without having identities imposed on them
by the state.196 That would liberate them to construct their own identities, live
according to them, and enjoy the social goods and opportunities associated with
full citizenship.197
While I agree with Laden that constitutional rights should be expanded in
the way he proposes, I want to explore not the ideal outcome, but rather some
strategies that could move us toward a culture in which such a constitutional
amendment would be feasible. How could social institutions, and in particular
law, operate differently with respect to gender norms to promote mental health
and individual freedom for members of society?
As we have seen, breaching the rigid, socially prescribed boundaries of
gender roles has serious consequences. Gender is not voluntary or optional. The
socially enforced rules about gender increase the prevalence of mental illness,
infringe in other ways on individual autonomy, and limit opportunities for selfdevelopment to an extent that could only be justified by a very compelling social
necessity. Yet, there is no compelling reason to coercively channel people into
pre-cut gender grooves that deform them. When a government, through its laws,
194.
195.
content
72.
196.
197.

Id. at 134–35.
That is, consistent with others’ rights and one’s own legitimate social obligations, the
of which are determined in a free and equal, fair deliberation among citizens. See id. at 171–
Id. at 179.
See id.
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treats persons in that manner, it deprives them of the respect that democratic
governments owe to their citizens.
III. PUTTING AN END TO THE GENDER SYSTEM
As we have seen, the gender system is profoundly damaging and unjust,
and law plays a critical role in creating and maintaining it. How can the legal
system gradually relinquish its role in creating, maintaining, and enforcing the
gender system? My proposed strategy is derived from the Law Commission of
Canada’s methodology in its 2001 study, Beyond Conjugality: Recognizing and
Supporting Close Personal Adult Relationships.198 To a much greater extent than the
U.S., Canada takes some care not to enforce majority prejudices of the sort
Dworkin considers unjust to enforce.199 Consider that for decades in the U.S., the
government was actively involved in the often coercive promotion of
heterosexual marriage. Federal and state aid programs providing financial
assistance to families who qualify often include monetary incentives for
beneficiaries to marry, and sometimes funds allocated to alleviate poverty may
be, and are, spent on marriage promotion programs with the (mistaken) idea that
marriage is a ticket out of poverty. Another example is the wave of state
constitutional amendments passed less than a decade ago to prohibit the
recognition of same-sex marriage and to punitively exclude even different-sex
conjugal couples from enjoying the benefits of marriage, in order to persuade
people to enter heterosexual marriages. The message of the U.S. to its citizens is:
if you want to enjoy the full benefits of citizenship, shoehorn yourself into the
form of family to which the majority has determined you should belong. Canada,
by contrast, seems to ask: what are our people’s needs and individual
preferences about their own lives? How can government better support people’s
plans of life and choices? How can we include a diversity of different
conceptions of the good and create an even playing field for them?
A. Canada’s Four-Question Methodology in Beyond Conjugality
In order to demonstrate how Canada’s approach could help rid the U.S. of
its worst institutional gender injustices, I will describe Canada’s strategy in
Beyond Conjugality. The Law Commission of Canada undertook the Beyond
Conjugality study of close personal adult relationships “[i]n keeping with its
mandate to consider measures that will make the legal system more efficient,
economical, accessible, and just.”200 The Commission wanted “to determine how
well law and policy were responding to contemporary realities”201 and “align
state policy with social facts.”202 It found that certain demographic shifts resulted
in more diversity in close personal adult relationships (CPARs) in the three
decades or so preceding the study. It classified these types of relationships into
198. Beyond Conjugality: Recognizing and Supporting Close Personal Adult Relationships, LAW
COMMISSION
OF
CANADA
(Dec.
21,
2001),
http://www.samesexmarriage.ca/docs/
beyond_conjugality.pdf [hereinafter Beyond Conjugality].
199. See supra part II.B.2.a.
200. Beyond Conjugality, supra note 198, at xxiv.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1.
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four categories: “conjugal,” “non-conjugal between relatives,” “non-conjugal
between non-relatives,” and “caregiving relationships.”203
The Commission explicitly stated the governmental objectives in regulating
CPARs, and the values and principles it sought to recognize and respect. The
governmental objective in recognizing CPARs is to provide an orderly
framework in which individuals can express commitment and assume rights and
responsibilities within relationships.204 The values endorsed by the Commission
include equal treatment of different types of CPARs; institutional support for
adult members of those relationships in setting and maintaining the parameters
of the roles that they wish to establish within those relationships; and individual
autonomy (for adults) in choosing the composition of one’s family.205 They also
include protecting individuals’ personal security, shielding relational privacy
from undue government intrusion, promoting freedom of conscience and
religion, coherence (proper tailoring of each regulation to its objective) and
administrative efficiency.206
The Commission’s methodology was to ask, for every Canadian law that
depended on a definition of family or on a determination of close personal adult
relationship status: which relationship status should be used for the purposes of
the law, if a relationship status should be used at all.207 It asks four questions:
1. Does the law pursue a legitimate policy objective?
2. Is the relationship status used relevant to the law’s objective?
3. Would the law’s objective still be accomplished if the individual could
designate which relationship(s) she would like the law to apply to?
4. Could the law be revised to more accurately define the relationship
status or function that is relevant to the law’s objective?208
If the answer to each of the first two questions is “yes,” then proceed to
question 3; “no” to either question marks the law for repeal or revision. “Yes” to
question 3 or 4 marks the law for revision, while “no” to both of those questions
permits it to remain unchanged.209
The Commission highlights the importance of the third question: if the
answer is yes, than allowing individual designation serves the value of
autonomy, decreases invasion of privacy (e.g., determining whether the
relationship is conjugal), and increases equality among different kinds of
relationships (e.g., conjugal vs. nonconjugal).210 The Commission considers the
advantages and disadvantages of extending common law marriage, including
the following:

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 2–6.
See id. at 115, 131.
See id. at 14–24.
Id. at 19–24.
Id. at 29–30.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 30–34.
Id. at 32–33.
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1. It is not clear what it means to live in a conjugal relationship, and very
personal inquiries may be required to determine the answer.
(Disadvantage)
2. One might overcome the problem in 1 by concentrating on the functions
of CPARs important to the state benefit: e.g., emotional intimacy, economic
interdependency, shared residence, but not sexual relationship.
(Advantage)
3. Marriages are universally understood, portable, and much less
complicated than tailored sets of relationship statuses. (Advantage)
4. Parties may be recognized as having a common law marriage when they
do not realize they are married, or when they wish not to be married.
(Disadvantage)211
The Commission also considers, as an alternative to extending common law
marriage, the advantages and disadvantages of creating a range of tailored
statuses based on the functions served by the particular relationship, including:
1. It provides greater certainty to the parties. (Advantage)
2. It may be less equality-promoting, unless well-tailored to objectives.
(Potential disadvantage)
3. It may be less coherent, unless well tailored to objectives.212 (Potential
disadvantage)
The Commission decides, while the data collected is studied further, to
continue to recognize civil marriages, which have the advantages of being
voluntary, stable, certain, and public. It concludes, after its examination, that
express individual contracts may be burdensome and costly for parties to make,
and that power differentials in bargaining power may leave some parties
vulnerable to exploitation.213 At the same time, it notes, enforcing implicit
contracts is costly and uncertain.214 It considers the option of ascription (e.g.,
imputing common law marriages to parties in certain cases), finding it useful
when necessary to protect a party from exploitation.215 However, the
Commission recognizes, ascription may infringe on individual autonomy by
imposing on parties what they have not chosen.216 Finally, it proposes the
creation of a new status called a Registered Domestic Partnership (RDP), which
like marriage, provides an orderly framework for people to express commitment
and assume rights and responsibilities, which is voluntary, stable, certain, and
public.217 Unlike marriage, though, it promotes equality among conjugal and
non-conjugal relationships, affirming individual autonomy and privacy.218
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. at 34–35.
See id. at 35.
Id. at 115–16.
Id.
Id. at 116.
Id.
Id. at 117–18.
Id. at 113–18.
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B. Adapting the Four-Question Procedure for Laws Utilizing Sex or Gender as a
Category
The same methodology used in Beyond Conjugality, including a version of
the four questions it asks tailored to the subject of gender identity, can provide a
guideline for reforming U.S. laws that depend on gender identity. We could ask,
of each law that creates or enforces gendered identity, or that requires a person
to identify as a man or woman to enjoy its protections or to avoid its penalties:
1. Does the law (or individual provision of a law) pursue a legitimate policy
objective?
2. Is the gender identification required or specified relevant to, or necessary
for accomplishing, the law’s objective?
3. Would the law’s objective still be accomplished if the individual could
designate which gender they would like to be identified as?
4. Could the law be revised to more accurately define the status, condition,
or function that is relevant to the law’s objective, instead of using gender
identity as a proxy?
Following the Beyond Conjugality report’s method, I will consider some
examples of laws that create or enforce gendered identity, or that require a
person to identify as a man or woman to enjoy its protections or avoid its
penalties.
First, it is worth noting that Canada’s Law Commission, in deciding to
retain marriage as a legally recognized form of CPAR, dispenses quickly with the
question of whether same-sex couples should qualify to enter into marriages:
[T]he argument that marriage should be reserved to heterosexual couples cannot
be sustained in a context where the state’s objectives underlying contemporary
state regulation of marriage are essentially contractual ones, relating to the
facilitation of private ordering. There is no justification for maintaining the
current distinctions between same-sex and heterosexual conjugal unions in light
of current understandings of the state’s interests in marriage. The secular
purpose of marriage is to provide an orderly framework in which people can
express their commitment to each other, receive public recognition and support,
and voluntarily assume a range of legal rights and obligations . . . [A]s the
Supreme Court of Canada has recognized, the capacity to form conjugal
relationships characterized by emotional and economic interdependence has
nothing to do with sexual orientation.219

So while the answer to the first question seems to be yes, marriage law does
pursue a legitimate policy objective (providing the orderly framework
mentioned), the second question must be answered in the negative. Gender
identification is not relevant to the law’s objective, and for that reason it must be
removed from the law. The Commission recommends just that: that civil
marriage in Canada should be gender neutral.220
The three further examples I will consider are laws requiring or permitting
219.
220.

Id. at 130 (citation omitted).
Id. at 129–31.
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sex to be specified by personal identification documents, laws permitting sexsegregated sports, and finally laws regarding sex-segregated prison housing. My
objective in undertaking this analysis is not to reach definitive conclusions about
how these matters should be addressed legally. Laws governing such matters
should be crafted after careful consideration of empirical data, robust attempts to
gather the data to answer important questions for which inadequate data exist,
and conscientious deliberation among policymakers as to how to balance various
competing interests. I will not pretend that I can singlehandedly resolve these
difficult issues. I only mean to provide examples of how the method might be
used to make good policy, and what sorts of reasons it would be important to
consider.
1. Identification Documents
Recall that a transgender person is vulnerable to the charge of fraud if the
sex specified on their driver’s license or other personal identification documents
(IDs) does not appear to match up with the bearer’s presentation. Moreover,
problems can arise when different states’ rules governing birth certificates and
drivers’ licenses conflict with one another, making it necessary but difficult to
determine what sex a person is “legally.” This can result in intrusive
examinations, or even overly hasty medical decisions (as in the case of intersex
newborns) for the sole purpose of checking a box on a form. So do we really need
to have people’s sex specified on these documents?
The first of the four questions asks whether laws requiring the creation,
carry, or production of IDs pursue a legitimate policy objective. The answer to
that question must be affirmative. Identification documents such as birth
certificates, driver’s licenses, and passports serve a variety of important state
interests. In the U.S., birth certificates indicate a person’s U.S. citizenship and
age, which must be verifiable for many purposes, including eligibility to vote
and to collect social security payments. Driver’s licenses serve state interests such
as the interest in security and the interest in child protection. People committing
crimes and traffic violations can be identified in police stops, and people can
prove they are old enough to purchase alcohol, be admitted to R-rated movies, or
get access to other age-restricted items. The international use of passports is
justified because a country should be able to ascertain who is within its borders,
to secure personal safety for all, to ensure citizens access to the goods of
citizenship, and to assist visitors. There are many other valid state objectives for
requiring the possession or display of IDs.
The second question asks whether the gender identification required or
specified is relevant to the law’s objective. Here it is important to distinguish
between the state’s asserted interests and its legitimate interests. For example,
the state could assert an interest in ensuring that biological males do not use
women’s public restrooms. For police to enforce restroom sex segregation, proof
of sex would be necessary. So a transwoman asked to show her license might be
identified on it as male, and police could exclude her from the women’s restroom
or ticket her afterwards for using it. However, there seems to be no legitimate
reason for including a sex or gender designation on a driver’s license, because
there is no legitimate reason for sex segregation of restrooms that have privacy
stalls; and all multi-person restrooms either do or should have stalls. The
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prevention of fraud does not justify identifying people’s sex on their drivers’
licenses either. A man could disguise himself as a woman to commit a fraud, but
he could also disguise himself as a man with a different appearance, using a
different color or hair-length wig, or pretending to walk with a limp while using
a cane, and also commit a fraud. Only a tiny fraction of frauds could be
prevented by a gender designation, and that small benefit of sex designation
does not justify the harm that is done by requiring a person to carry a label that
they do not wish to apply to themselves. Because the answer to the second
question is “no,” laws requiring sex or gender to be indicated on IDs should be
amended not to require that.
For the sake of argument, suppose someone were convinced that there is a
legitimate state interest in specifying sex or gender on some types of IDs. Then
we would reach the third question: Would the law’s objective still be
accomplished if the individual could designate which gender they would like to
be identified as? And here it is difficult to understand why any state interest in
identifying a person’s gender could not be satisfied by permitting the individual
who is labeled to choose the designation, instead of the state choosing it. As
explained earlier, the assignment of gender, and even sex, is a choice. The
categories do not have to be binary, and assignment to one category or another is
arbitrary, since the categories themselves are arbitrary. There is no obvious
reason why, even if the state has a legitimate interest in being able to identify a
person’s gender at any time, there must be only two genders. More than two
would actually enhance accurate identification of individuals, since it would
reduce the number of individuals to whom any given designation applies.
However many categories are chosen, what would seem to be important
(supposing the state has a legitimate interest in requiring the specification of
gender on a person’s IDs) is that everyone belong to one, and only one category;
but why should the state, rather than the individual, choose the designation? To
the state it should make no difference. To the individual who would be labeled, it
makes an enormous difference. Thus, even if the state did have an interest in
requiring the designation of a person’s sex on their IDs, the laws requiring such
designations should permit the individuals labeled to choose their designation,
and there should be a procedure for changing designation when appropriate (as
when a person transitions from one gender to another). Therefore, although laws
requiring the creation, carry, or production of IDs pursue a legitimate policy
objective, gender identification is not necessary for accomplishing the objective;
and even if it were necessary, the individual identified should be permitted to
choose the gender designation indicated on the document. Either way, justice
and citizen/resident well-being require amendment of many ID laws.
2. Sex Segregation in Sports
How can the Law Commission of Canada’s four-question methodology be
used to evaluate legally required or permitted sex segregation in sports? In
sports, sex segregation is widely accepted, even by many of the most ardent
feminists, as justified by biological differences between men and women.
Equality feminists stress that identical treatment is not always equal treatment,
when the needs of females and males differ and the needs that society is
organized to satisfy are the male needs. As mentioned earlier, Bem refers to this
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as androcentrism.221 To avoid privileging the male body, society must be arranged
to accommodate the female anatomy and physiology as well as the male. So
employment disability policies should not exclude pregnancy from benefits
coverage,222 and divorce laws should not pretend that mothers and fathers are
similarly situated “parents” of their children.223
Popular wisdom about most sports that people of both sexes commonly
play is that post-pubescent males generally have significant biological
performance advantages over post-pubescent females, perhaps due to much
higher levels of testosterone, greater lean body mass and lung capacity, and even
mechanical advantages such as narrow hips for faster running and greater
average size and height. Most people believe that if adult competitive sports
were not segregated, very few women would have opportunities to play, since
tryouts would result in all-male or nearly all-male teams.224
Title IX of the United States Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits sex
discrimination in any educational program that receives federal financial
assistance, including primary, secondary and post-secondary athletic
programs.225 Nonetheless, “where selection for . . . teams is based upon
competitive skill,” or the sport is a contact sport, Title IX permits sex
segregation.226 Relevant and significant to consider, then, in the context of sex
segregation of sports, are the exemptions to Title IX that effectively permit the
widespread sex segregation of sports.
The first question to consider is whether the law, and its exemptions, each
advance legitimate policy objectives. Title IX’s objective is to prevent sex
discrimination in federally assisted educational programs, including sports
programs. That is a legitimate, in fact commendable, objective. What is the policy
objective served by the contact sports exemption? Legal decisions denying boys
access to girls’ teams have stated or implied that allowing arrangements to
protect girls from physical harm is the exemption’s purpose.227 The objective
served by the competitive selection exemption apparently is to protect girls’
opportunities to play. These objectives are surely legitimate as well.
221. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
222. The U.S. Supreme Court found that excluding pregnancy from employment disability
policies was not discrimination based on sex; rather, said the Court, the policies discriminated
between “pregnant persons” and “nonpregnant persons.” See BEM, supra note 47, at 74–77. This
decision was widely ridiculed, and soon mooted by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, which
amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
223. Martha Albertson Fineman has been an outspoken critic of gender neutral divorce laws,
which operate to disadvantage mothers and children by assuming that parent-child attachments are
the same for both parents, and that both parents are equally positioned to support children
financially, when in fact mothers usually have far less earning power because of the time they devote
to caring for their families at the expense of their careers. See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN,
THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995).
224. Adam Love & Kimberly Kelly, Equity or Essentialism? U.S. Courts and the Legitimation of Girls’
Teams in High School Sport, 25 GENDER & SOC’Y 227, 229–30 (2011) [hereinafter Equity or Essentialism?];
EILEEN MCDONAGH & LAURA PAPPANO, PLAYING WITH THE BOYS: WHY SEPARATE IS NOT EQUAL IN
SPORTS 41, 58 (2008).
225. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1972).
226. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (1975).
227. See Equity or Essentialism?, supra note 224, at 242–43.
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The second question is whether the use of sex as a legal category is relevant
to the law’s objective of preventing sex discrimination in sports. In order to
determine whether sex discrimination is occurring, or to prevent its occurrence,
it is necessary to legally recognize sex as a social category and possible basis of
discrimination. Not to do so would be to make a similar mistake to the one the
U.S. Supreme Court made when it found that excluding only pregnancy, and no
other condition, from employment disability policies did not constitute sex
discrimination.228 We could ignore the fact that only one sex can become
pregnant, but ignoring sex as a category in such a case does not advance sex
equality. Instead, it aggravates sex inequality by refusing to recognize the
pertinence of sex in the specific case. Any law that seeks to protect against sex
discrimination must recognize sex as a category in order to provide the intended
protection.
The Title IX exemptions use the category of sex differently than the law itself,
however. They offer opportunities to continue practicing sex discrimination, in
the form of segregation, in ways that otherwise would be prohibited by Title IX.
So it becomes important to ask whether these exemptions appropriately advance
the law’s objective by accommodating ways in which females and males are not
similarly situated (as in the pregnancy disability case), or whether they prevent
the law from going as far as it should to promote sex equality in sports. Let us
begin with the contact sports exemption. “[C]ontact sports include boxing,
wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball and other sports the purpose or
major activity of which involves bodily contact.”229 The purpose of this
exemption has been interpreted by courts to be to protect girls and young
women (but not boys and young men) from harm.230 That has a common sense
appeal to it, when one considers that post-pubescent males are, on average,
larger and heavier than post-pubescent females.231 A justification for exempting
pre-pubescent sports (those played at an age at which it would be very rare for
any child to have reached puberty) seems absent, however, since boys and girls
do not differ in average size or strength at that stage of life. With respect to
young adult women, such as college aged women, this exemption may be
228. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
229. Equity or Essentialism?, supra note 224, at 238.
230. See, e.g., Kleczek v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, 612 A.2d 734 (R.I. 1992) (finding
that the league had a compelling reason to exclude boys, such as the plaintiff, from girls’ field hockey
because of the risk of harm); Williams v. Sch. Dist., 998 F.2d 168, 179–81 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Kleczek
in the course of reversing the district court’s order granting summary judgment for the plaintiff and
remanding the factual question of “whether there are any real physical differences between boys and
girls that warrant different treatment, and whether boys are likely to dominate the school's athletic
program if admitted to the girls’ teams.”). That these are two separate factual questions necessary to
determine the legal question demonstrates that protecting girls’ opportunities is not the only issue;
and whether a boy will cause girls physical harm seems like the only other reason for its relevance.
However, girl plaintiffs have been granted opportunities to play on boys’ football teams on equal
protection (rather than Title IX) grounds. E.g. Lantz v. Ambach, 620 F. Supp. 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
Therefore, while boys entering a girls’ team pose too great a risk of harm to girls, girls entering a
boys’ team don’t pose too great a risk of harm to boys, even though the sports are both (regarded as)
contact sports. See Equity or Essentialism?, supra note 224, at 242–43.
231. Cheryl D. Fryar, et al., Anthropometric Reference Data for Children and Adults: United States,
2007–2010, 11 VITAL HEALTH STAT 252 (2012), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/
sr_11/sr11_252.pdf.
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unduly paternalistic. Playing contact sports involves certain risks to players,
which they assume in deciding to play the sport. Sports such as boxing and
wrestling have weight classes, which mitigate some of the average differences
between men and women. While men tend to be on average stronger at the same
weight, many believe that this difference has to do with training regimens rather
than hormonal or other biological differences.232 One might still argue that postpubescent girls—who are not yet adults—should be protected from possible
harms involved in playing contact sports with boys. That reasoning leads equally
to the conclusion that smaller boys should not be permitted to play, and could
cause us to conclude that children should not play contact sports at all due to the
risk of harm. Since the protection of children—rather than the paternalistic
protection or exclusion of girls—does not seem to be the real concern at work, it
is difficult not to conclude that the contact sports exemption fails to advance the
legitimate purposes of Title IX, and that it should be removed from the law.
Now let us turn to the competitive selection exemption. Does it
appropriately advance the objective of Title IX, to prevent sex discrimination in
sports, by accommodating ways in which females and males are not similarly
situated? It does not paternalistically single out girls and young women for
protection that boys and young men do not receive. Some would say that it
protects girls’ and young women’s opportunities to play sports by creating a
domain in which males will not be selected for nearly all of the positions. But the
idea that, without segregated sports, males would dominate in tryouts and win
nearly all the positions is a supposition that some argue is both false, and
perpetuates a self-fulfilling prophecy.233 On this view, females tend to perform
less competitively than males, on average, in certain sports, because they have
always played on sex segregated teams for which expectations were always
lower. They internalized the belief that males have natural advantages that make
them superior players. And the stereotype threat arising from segregation itself
has made female players, on average, perform at a lower level than male
players.234 If that is true, then the competitive selection exemption is also
unjustified and should be removed. This empirical question may take time to
answer, but the state has an obligation of justice to take affirmative action to
answer it (as by providing certain legal incentives not to sex segregate select
sports that have been segregated in the past) rather than to simply accept the sex
discrimination that the exemption involves as necessary to prevent worse sex
discrimination.
232. The Massachusetts Supreme Court, in ruling unlawful an exclusion of boys from girls’
teams, remarked, “any notion that young women are so inherently weak, delicate or physically
inadequate that the state must protect them from the folly of participation in vigorous athletics is a
cultural anachronism unrelated to reality” (citation omitted). Equity or Essentialism?, supra note 2274,
at 241. For that reason, “classification on strict grounds of sex, without reference to actual skill
differentials in particular sports, would merely echo ‘archaic and overbroad generalizations’”
(citation omitted). Id. However, more recent decisions have diverged from this 1979 case, as trends
have returned us to widespread belief in essential sex differences. Id. at 241–42.
233. Equity or Essentialism?, supra note 224, at 245–46; MCDONAGH & PAPPANO, supra note 224, at
58.
234. See Equity or Essentialism?, supra note 224, at 245–46; Katrina Karkazis & Rebecca JordanYoung, The Trouble with Too Much T, N.Y. TIMES (April 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
04/11/opinion/the-trouble-with-too-much-t.html?emc=eta1&_r=1.
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Assuming the exemption turns out to be necessary, we might reach the
third question: would the law’s objective still be accomplished if the individual
could designate which gender they would like to be identified as? What makes
this a complicated matter is that the psychological attributes and physical skills
that play the greatest role in athletic excellence are developed from an early age.
If indeed there are relevant biological reasons for segregating sports, by the time
a person chooses a sex identity, the relevant attributes and skills will already
have been developed as the girl or boy the person was. It is certainly no solution
to ask children to choose sex identity young, for all the reasons discussed
earlier.235 Those reasons instead point in the direction of discouraging children
from identifying with a specific gender until their late teen or even adult years.
So if the reasons for the competitive selection exemption are legitimate,
individuals probably could not choose their gender without undermining its
objective.
However, reaching the fourth question (continuing to assume the
exemption turns out to be necessary), the law could be revised to more accurately
define the status or function that is relevant to the law’s objective, instead of
using gender identity as a proxy.236 Here the “law” at issue would be the Title IX
competitive selection exemption. If the status or function relevant to sports
performance is size, or strength, or speed, or skill, that attribute could be used
directly to categorize athletes, rather than using sex as a proxy for other, relevant
attributes. While women are not as large or strong as men on average, there are
women who can outperform most men at even the most grueling physical tasks.
Consider, for example, the two women who qualified as U.S. Army Rangers,
when 60% of the men who attempt the two-month course fail to pass the test and
qualify.237 Rather than observe that men on average are larger or stronger in a
sport where size or strength is an advantage, and segregate by sex, why not
simply group by size or strength? Classifications based on the attribute in
question would be more accurate and functionally superior, and more just,
because they would not engage in unjustified (or any) sex discrimination.
Thus, even assuming that further empirical data that the state proactively
gathers demonstrate that there are relevant biological differences between men
and women on average in the performance of certain sports, the objective of Title
IX’s competitive selection exemption could be satisfied by classifying athletes
according to the actual attribute relevant in the particular sport, rather than using
sex as a proxy. That exemption, like the contact sports exemption that treats girls
and women but not boys and men paternalistically, should be removed from
Title IX if the facts assumed in this analysis are accurate.
235. See supra pp. 177–78.
236. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
district court was not in error when it rejected the Alabama Board of Corrections’ claim that requiring
prison guards to be at least 5 feet 2 inches in height and 120 pounds in weight was a bona fide
occupational qualification. That requirement had a disparate impact on women, since it excluded
more than 40% of women but less than 1% of men. Id. at 329–30. Noting the lack of evidence of a
direct correlation between height or weight and strength or ability, the Court remarked that a direct
strength requirement, rather than the use of a proxy for sex, could qualify as a bona fide occupational
qualification if it were found necessary for performing the job effectively. Id. at 331–32.
237. Two Women Qualify as U.S. Army Rangers, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 18, 2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/aug/18/two-women-qualify-as-us-army-rangers.
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3. Sex-segregated Prison Housing
The third case to which I will apply the Law Commission of Canada’s fourquestion methodology returns us to where we began: the case of Michelle
Kosilek, a transwoman who sought sex reassignment surgery (SRS). What if the
appeals court had affirmed the district court’s injunction requiring the
Department of Corrections (DOC) to provide SRS for Kosilek?
Does a transwoman belong in a men’s prison, or in a women’s prison? This
prison housing question has arisen in a surprising number of cases. One reason
why states object to providing SRS for prisoners is that each prisoner must be
housed in either a women’s or a men’s prison, and either option poses
difficulties. Prisoners could be housed according to their current legal sex, or the
legal sex they were at sentencing. As discussed earlier, one’s “legal sex” is not a
simple question, and the answer may vary depending on the state in which one
resides.238 In nearly all of the legal cases involving transgender prisoners, the
prison’s practice is to house the prisoner according to their presumed sex at
sentencing, without any determination of the person’s legal sex. Until relatively
recently, courts, legislatures, and correctional facilities operated under the
assumption that a person’s sex is an easily ascertainable and permanent fact.
That a person’s sex assigned at birth, current sex, sex of sentencing, sex of selfidentification, and legal sex are identities that can differ, was not even
considered. So prison housing, like so many institutions within society, is
organized as if it were a brute natural fact that there are two easily determinable
sexes, female and male. Because the assumption of natural dichotomous sex does
not match up with reality, institutions such as prisons must adjust to
accommodate newly acknowledged facts.239
Given the mismatch between institutional organization and reality, an
interim solution must be found immediately for a prisoner such as Kosilek, who
was assigned “male” at birth and sentenced as a man, but who is now a woman
(absence of SRS not withstanding) housed in a men’s prison. Housing a woman
in a men’s prison raises concerns for her safety. She might be vulnerable to rape
or other violence, targeted because of her gender. Even though Kosilek was not
so targeted, this is a legitimate worry given the gender hierarchy and prevalence
of male violence against women throughout society. Prison officials argued
against providing SRS for Kosilek on security grounds: that having a woman in a
men’s prison would disrupt prison security, including making Kosilek
238. See supra pp. 189–90.
239. The Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003 (PREA) created a commission to develop standards
for eliminating prison rape. In 2012, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) passed a final rule based on
the commission’s recommendations, which required departments of corrections to make individual
decisions about where transgender inmates should be housed, and directed them to take into account
the inmates’ judgments about whether they would be safest housed with men or women.
Nonetheless, prisons have continued to house inmates based on their genital anatomy. E.g., Maria L.
La Ganga, US Prohibits Imprisoning Transgender Inmates in Cells Based on Birth Anatomy, THE GUARDIAN
(Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/mar/24/transgender-prison-genderidentity-anatomy-doj-rules. In March 2016 the DOJ released a clarification that “a policy that houses
transgender or intersex inmates based exclusively on external genital anatomy” violates PREA
standards. Case-by-case consideration of each inmate’s situation is required. National PREA Resource
Center, Compliance, LGBTI Inmates/Residents/Detainees/Staff, 115.42, 115.43, Screening (Mar. 24,
2016), http://www.prearesourcecenter.org/node/3927.
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vulnerable to violence. This demonstrates that prison officials do not regard
Kosilek, in the absence of SRS, as a woman; and that they would regard her as a
woman if she had received SRS. The trouble with transferring her to a women’s
prison after surgery would have been, it seems, that she would still be regarded
as posing a risk of harm to “real women.” The issue may be partly political:
imagine the public outcry that would ensue if a person serving time for an
extreme form of violence against women—wife murder—ended up housed with
women to unleash more violence upon. But of course, there are many violent
women in prison—some undoubtedly for murder—who pose a risk of serious
harm to other women absent adequate security. How is Kosilek different, with or
without SRS? The only difference seems to be that she would not be regarded,
even if she had received SRS, as a “real woman” like the other women prisoners.
At the same time, with SRS, she would no longer be perceived as a man, and
could be a likely target of violence in a men’s prison, where only men belong.
Because she does not fit within the sex dichotomy around which society is
organized, there is no appropriate place to house Kosilek whether or not she
receives SRS.240
Let us engage in our four-question examination of the necessity of
segregating prisons by sex. First, does criminal law imposing imprisonment as
punishment for crime pursue a legitimate policy objective? The answer to this
seems to be affirmative. There is widespread agreement in society that certain
behaviors should be criminalized and that crimes should be punished.
Imprisonment has been considered the humane alternative to torture and is
regarded as a lesser punishment than death in states where death is a legal
punishment. Granted, which behavior should be criminalized, sentencing length,
and prison conditions can be controversial, but in general Americans accept
imprisonment as punishment for serious or frequent criminal adult behavior.
The imprisonment itself, though, is the punishment prescribed. Prisoner-onprisoner violence, like legally unjustified guard-on-prisoner violence, is
something correctional facilities, as institutions, aim (or should aim) to prevent.
We now reach the second question: is separation of men and women into
different prisons, or different units within prisons, a necessary or appropriate
component of the law, if it is to serve its objective effectively? Legally authorized
punishment is only effective if violence among prisoners is generally prevented.
The justification for sex segregation seems to be to protect female prisoners from
the potential violence or other harm that male prisoners could otherwise inflict
on them. While it is surely the case that women can inflict violence on one
another, and that men are also vulnerable to violence in men’s prisons, there are
several factors that make male violence against women a special case. First, sex
hierarchy pervades all of society, including prisons. That means there is a wide
social context in which men as a class view women as a class as particularly
appropriate or vulnerable targets for violence. In the context of social sex
hierarchy, men are prone to viewing women as inferior, and frequently engage in
240. Some suggest that she could be placed in isolated quarters, essentially solitary confinement.
Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 243 (D. Mass. 2012). But that arrangement wrongfully
increases the punishment she would receive beyond that to which she was sentenced. It is an
additional punishment, for being transgender, in addition to the sentence a conventionally gendered
man or woman would have served in the same prison.
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aggression and violence against them. Women are socialized to be submissive
and, compared to men, are usually ill equipped, physically, psychologically and
emotionally, to defend themselves. They tend to be more conciliatory in conflicts
with men outside prison, and in a gender-integrated prison would seem more
likely to end up victims of male aggression and violence. Second, at least in part
because of their social conditioning, women tend on average to be smaller, less
strong, and less skilled and experienced with fighting than men. Finally,
prisoners share sleeping quarters, toilets, and shower facilities. Given the sexual
objectification of women throughout the culture, forcing women to shower with
men or to share sleeping quarters makes women highly vulnerable to sexual
harassment and violence, including rape. Although in a future without
institutionalized sex dichotomy or widespread social hierarchy sex segregation
in prison might be unnecessary, today under current conditions sex segregation
in prisons is justified.
That leads us to the third question: would the objective of the law still be
accomplished effectively if the individual could designate which gender category
he or she belongs to? Certainly prisoners could be punished by imprisonment if
they chose their gender identity. Prison would still be a deterrent to crime for,
and/or would exact retribution from, transgender people housed in a facility
consistent with their gender identity, as is the case with conventionally gendered
people. Would allowing prisoners to self-identify as female or male make anyone
an especially vulnerable target for violence? As just discussed, sex hierarchy in
society constructs men as dominant and women as subordinate. A transwoman,
such as Kosilek, in a women’s prison would have adopted the identity of the
subordinate. She also has likely felt what it is like to be a social subordinate, both
as a woman and as transgender, in how she is treated by others. Perhaps being in
a women’s prison would not rectify that, but there is no reason to think it would
exacerbate it either. It also appears unlikely that a transwoman would have the
superior or aggressive attitude that a man might have toward women he lives
with. Some suggest that conventionally gendered men might pretend to be
transgender to be housed in a female prison, where they could escape the greater
brutality of men’s prison.241 People who suggest that do not, in my view,
understand the rigidity of the sex hierarchy, which makes it extremely unlikely a
man would surrender his status and lower himself far enough on the social
hierarchy to live as a woman, if in fact he did not identify sincerely as a woman.
Being viewed as effeminate would be worse to him, in all likelihood, than the
brutality of men’s prison. Moreover, if false representations about gender
identity became a problem, the sentencing court could verify that the person
convicted identifies with the sex category that they claim to, based on evidence of
how they lived prior to the arrest. For people who transition in prison that may
be trickier, but gender identity could be established in a hearing, before a body
that is equipped to determine a wide variety of factual issues (such as a
corrections hearing board or court) at the prisoner’s request.
The greater risk of fraud would be the possibility that a transman would

241. Female prisoners engage in fewer, and less serious, acts of violence compared to male
prisoners. See Miles D. Harer & Neal P. Langan, Gender Differences in Predictors of Prison Violence:
Assessing the Predictive Validity of a Risk Classification System, 47 CRIME & DELINQ. 513, 521–23 (2001).
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pretend to identify as a woman in order to escape the brutality of men’s prison.
However, transmen almost certainly go to women’s prisons as things are. So
even if that occurred, it would not increase the risk of harm to women in prison,
or to transmen in women’s prison, compared to the current practice. A transman
would also be less likely than a woman—perhaps less likely than some small or
not very masculine men—to appear as a target for violence to other men in
prison, due to the self-consciousness with which he has adopted and practices
masculine behaviors. The most difficult situation would be for a non-operative or
pre-operative transman in a men’s prison. His different anatomy would surely be
noticed by those around him, and that would be likely to make him a target of
violence both for the appearance of his genitals and his audacity to claim a place
among the dominant class, a place where he will be seen as an imposter. For that
reason, it might be necessary to house non-operative or pre-operative transmen
in women’s prisons. Two questions would need further investigation. First,
whether a non-operative or pre-operative transman would pose a threat to the
women with whom he is housed (perhaps misbehavior could lose him this
privilege, and cause him to be transferred to men’s prison); and second, whether
if he chose to be or otherwise wound up housed with men, that would create too
great a risk to his safety. In short, then, it may be possible for prisoners to choose
a sex category based on their own personal identity, at least in many cases.
Could the law be revised to more accurately define the status or function
that is relevant to prison housing segregation? Perhaps. If the worry is that men
are larger, stronger, and more prone to violence because of socialization, perhaps
prisoners could be housed according to these more relevant factors, rather than
using sex as a proxy for size, strength, and proneness to violence. Proneness to
violence might be ascertainable by viewing the person’s criminal record or other
aspects of their personal history. Size and lean mass are easily measured.
Perhaps people could be housed based on a formula combining their history of
violence, size, and other factors to divide them into appropriate classes, like
weight classes in boxing. Different prison units could be composed of different
classes of prisoner, more finer grained than maximum and minimum security.
Sex hierarchy might still be considered a factor in proneness and vulnerability to
violence, so that the sex identity a person was raised with, and that a person
currently identifies with, could serve as two more factors in the formula
determining housing classes in prison.
Certainly using sex to segregate people is more convenient than dividing
them into classes in this way. But it would be convenient to use sex as a proxy for
a great many things, including who should stay home with children and who
should work full time, or who is the “head of household” for census or tax
purposes. But these shortcuts play an enormous role in galvanizing sex roles,
which are hierarchically arranged, and which cause so many other problems,
especially once we recognize that the two-sex model does not match up with
reality. These convenient shortcuts are also unjust to women, whose
subordination is reinforced through them.
For all of these reasons, sex segregation in prison housing—and sex
discrimination everywhere in society—needs careful reexamination so that our
social institutions do not continue to perpetuate the ignorant errors of the past. In
particular, we should stop using the female sex as a proxy for vulnerability. We
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should recognize existing vulnerability and protect those who are vulnerable, but
we should not maintain and sustain vulnerability by assuming it is natural
instead of noticing how we ourselves create it.
CONCLUSIONS
Michelle Kosilek should have received the SRS that her physicians
prescribed for her, which likely would be eligible for Medicare reimbursement if
she were not incarcerated. The punishment that the state legitimately imposes is
incarceration, for both the conventionally gendered and for the gender
nonconforming. Subjecting Kosilek to additional suffering because of her
position as an outcast in an unjust gender system, over which she has no control,
should be considered cruel and unusual by contemporary standards. Reasonable
and sincere inquiry should be made into whether Kosilek should be transferred
to a women’s prison. My inclination is say that since she is a woman who must
be in prison, she should be in a women’s prison, unless sufficiently compelling
reasons—not political or public relations reasons—can be produced why she
should not.
As we have seen, the medical community contributes to the construction
and maintenance of the binary gender system, especially through practices of
natal sex assignment, and the medicalization of intersex conditions. Medicine
also tends to naturalize the sex/gender dichotomy and reinforce people’s
tendency to essentialize binary sex and gender. Despite that, it is difficult to find
epistemically responsible reasons to suppose that gendered social behaviors arise
from hardwired differences in people’s brains, given that numerous scientific
studies attempted to find such differences and failed.
We also considered how law, as well as medicine, constructs and coercively
enforces binary identities along lines of gender and sex, and how transgender
and intersex conditions emerge from this model. The social creation,
maintenance, and enforcement of a gender system contributes to mental illness,
and unnecessarily, unjustly and disrespectfully constrains individual liberty. The
American legal system should re-examine laws that use sex or gender as a
category by adapting the Law Commission of Canada’s methodology in Beyond
Conjugality, perhaps in the way I have suggested. In this fashion, it can begin to
move gradually away from the creation, maintenance, and enforcement of the
gender system.
That probably will not mean eliminating legal categories of gender and sex
altogether, all at once. Some categories are necessary to protect those who are
subordinated within the gender hierarchy, hopefully only temporarily, until the
culture begins to relinquish gender. For instance, ending sex segregation in
locker rooms or dressing rooms where people change clothes or shower would
harm women, intersex, and transgender people, given the current state of the
gender hierarchy. As with affirmative action to try to achieve racially diverse
student bodies and workplaces, it is hoped that differential treatment is a
temporary way to get to a point when it will no longer be needed, because the
hierarchy it is aimed at demolishing will no longer exist. Some ways to mitigate
the immediate problem of prison housing include reducing prison populations
generally by improving education, providing or subsidizing safe, affordable
childcare, ensuring universal access to treatment for addiction, and improving
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other social opportunities for people so that they are less likely to resort to crime.
Criminal reform, especially as it relates to nonviolent drug offenders, and better
legal representation for people with limited financial means, would also shrink
prison populations. The overrepresentation of transgender people in prison
could be eliminated by affording them reliable protection from employment
discrimination so their access to respectable, legal employment is ensured;
including them within the social infrastructure of family, which provides
significant support and opportunities for personal investment in others; and
ensuring them access to affordable, appropriate health care, so they are not
forced to seek drugs they need to maintain their gender identity in a shadow
market.
There are a number of other things we can do immediately as a society,
other than legal reform, to reduce the suffering caused by the gender system. We
can all stop gender policing others’ behavior that may be perceived as sex
atypical. We should find a solution to the gender-neutral pronoun problem, since
language so powerfully shapes how we think. And we should increase the
number of unisex restroom facilities in public places. Parents could permit
intersex teens to decide whether to take hormones or undergo genital surgery
after helping them obtain the information they need to make a good decision.
Parents could stop immediate sex-norming surgery on infants by explicitly
communicating to the doctor attending a birth that this is not wanted (and could
withhold consent for sex norming operations on young children). Parents-to-be
could educate themselves so they are prepared to make these decisions, if
necessary, when they bring a child into the world or into their family. And there
are probably hundreds of other things we can do individually or in small groups
to relieve suffering caused by the gender system. Justice, and concern for the
well-being of the people of our nation and beyond, entreat us to resist the gender
system.

